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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1908, James Barr Ames concluded his classic lecture on Law
and Morals by posing the problem of a duty to rescue., Suppose, he
said, that you are walking over a bridge when a man falls into the
water and cries out for help. Do you have an obligation to save him
from drowning by throwing a nearby rope? As the law then stood, the
answer clearly was no. "The law does not compel active benevolence
between man and man. It is left to one's conscience whether he shall
be the good Samaritan or not."2 Nevertheless, Ames asserted, it was
difficult to see why the law should remain in this condition. The law
was utilitarian; it existed to serve the reasonable needs of society.3
We would all be better satisfied, he thought, if a person who refused to
rescue another from death or great bodily harm, when he could do so
1. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97,111-13 (1908).
2. Id. at 112.
3. Id. at 110.
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with little or no inconvenience to himself, could be punished and
required to compensate the victim or his survivors.4
Over the century, Ames's view has achieved only limited suc-
cess. Many scholars have sharply criticized the general rule against a
duty to rescue.5 Judicial decisions have steadily eroded the rule in two
ways: by recognizing exceptions in which the law imposes a duty to
aid strangers and by expanding the class of special relationships that
give rise to affirmative duties.6 Despite these developments, the
absence of a duty to rescue remains the general rule in both tort and
criminal law. Although the persistence of this doctrine sometimes is
attributed merely to the practical difficulties involved in defining and
enforcing such an obligation,7 the true explanation appears to lie
deeper, in uncertainty about whether a duty to rescue is justified in
principle.
Three forceful arguments have been advanced against a legal
duty to rescue. The first is historical: in the absence of an un-
dertaking by the defendant or a special relationship between the
parties, the common law imposed liability solely for misfeasance, or
wrongfully causing harm to others, and not for nonfeasance, or failing
to act for their benefit.8 Of course, the mere fact that the law tradi-
tionally has taken a position does not mean that the position is sound
or should be followed9 The historical objection implies, however, that
4. Id. at 112-13. In order to accurately represent some of the views discussed in this
Article, I shall follow their use of masculine language when describing those views. On the
feminist critique of traditional approaches to the problem of rescue, see text accompanying notes
342-55.
5. See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. c at 117 (1965) (stating that
'[s]uch decisions have been condemned by legal writers as revolting to any moral sense"); W. Page
Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56 at 376 (West, 5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser
and Keeton'); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ. 3,
36 (1988) (arguing that 'It]he 'no duty' rule is a consequence of a legal system devoid of care and
responsiveness to the safety of others).
6. Under contemporary tort law, an actor has a duty to aid a stranger in two categories of
cases: (1) when the actor's own conduct, although innocent, has caused either harm or an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, see Restatement §§ 321-22; and (2) when the actor has
voluntarily undertaken to act for the benefit or protection of another, see id. §§ 323-24. For the
most part, the second category is limited to situations in which the actor's conduct has made the
other worse off, either through detrimental reliance or by increasing the risk of harm. In general,
therefore, these two categories represent an extension of the notion of misfeasance. In this
respect they differ from duties based on special relationships, which constitute true affirmative
duties to protect others from harm regardless of its source. Compare id. § 314A cmt. d (discussing
the scope of these duties). On the relationships that give rise to such duties, see text
accompanying note 387.
7. See Proser and Keeton § 56 at 376 (cited in note 5).
8. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, in
Francis H. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 33 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1926).
9. As Justice Holmes observed, 'It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds on
1994] 675
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the no-duty doctrine is so deeply woven into the fabric of Anglo-
American law that it cannot be altered without radically transforming
that law. Advocates of such change bear a heavy burden of
persuasion. 10 Moreover, the historical argument suggests that the
absence of a duty to rescue is consonant with-and indeed may be
required by-the fundamental substantive values of the legal system.
The second objection focuses on these substantive values. It
contends that a legal duty to rescue would run counter to the liberal
principles that inform our legal order. Invoking the natural rights
tradition of Locke and Kant, this argument asserts that the proper
function of law is to protect individual rights against infringement. As
long as a person refrains from injuring others, he should be free to act
as he wishes. It is inappropriate for the law to require one person to
act solely for the benefit of another. Although there may be a moral
obligation to aid others in distress, the enforcement of moral precepts
is beyond the legitimate province of law. While this argument has
been articulated most forcefully by libertarian writers," it reflects an
understanding of the liberal tradition that is shared by many others
as well.12
The historical and liberal arguments reject a duty to rescue as
a matter of both tort and criminal law. A third objection, which fo-
cuses specifically on tort law, derives from the theory of legal formal-
ism developed in recent years by Ernest J. Weinrib.13 Also drawing on
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
10. Compare Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations, in Studies in the Law of Torts at 37 (cited in
note 8) (noting that "[it is inevitable that the duties which public policy imposes on various
relations shall be ascertained not only by a balance struck between [the values on both sides of
the issue,] but also by a regard for, and deference to, long established precedents and usages").
11. The best-known libertarian critique of a duty to rescue is Richard A. Epstein, A Theory
of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 197-204 (1973). See also Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism
and the Causation of Harm, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 230 (1980). See generally Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia ix (Basic Books, 1974) (contending that a legitimate state "may not use its
coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others").
12. See, for example, Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 33 (cited in note 5) (asserting that the ab-
sence of a legal duty to rescue reflects "liberalism's concerns for autonomy and liberty); Robert
Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 196, 214 (1946)
(attributing the rule to an ideology of individualism).
13. See Ernest Weinrib, Rescue and Restitution, 1 S'vara 59 (1990); Ernest Weinrib, The
Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGill L. J. 403, 411 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding
Tort Law, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. 485, 516-17 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in
Private Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283, 1286.93, 1297-1301 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L. J. 949, 978 (1988); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and Corrective Justice, 1 Can. J. L. & Juris. 3, 6 (1988); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472, 489 (1987). Weinrib's views are
developed more fully in a forthcoming book entitled The Idea of Private Law (Harvard U., __).
676 [47:673
DUTY TO RESCUE
the natural right tradition, and especially on the thought of Kant and
Hegel, Weinrib contends that the structure of private law, including
the law of torts, is inherently negative. 4 Private law consists of com-
mands forbidding individuals to invade the rights of others. On this
view, imposing an affirmative duty to rescue would be inconsistent
with the very structure of private law.5
Taken together, these three arguments constitute a powerful
defense of the no-duty doctrine. They assert that imposing an af-
firmative duty to rescue would conflict with the historical character,
the substantive values, and the formal structure of our legal system.
In this Article, I respond to these arguments and develop a
rationale for a general duty to rescue. I begin by assessing the widely
held view that the traditional common law imposed liability only for
misfeasance and not for nonfeasance. As I show in Part II, this view
is only partly correct. Although the common law generally imposed no
private liability for failures to act, it did impose various affirmative
duties as a matter of public law. Many of these positive duties related
to the prevention of criminal violence. In particular, substantial
authority supports the view that the common law imposed a duty
(enforceable by criminal sanctions) to intervene to prevent a felony of
violence in instances in which one knew that such an offense was
being committed and had the power to prevent it. Thus, the
traditional common law may well have recognized a duty to act in
cases like the murder of Catherine Genovese 16 and the New Bedford
In an excellent earlier article, Weinrib argued in favor of a duty to rescue on moral grounds.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L. J. 247 (1980) ("Affirmative
Case"). More recently, however, he has developed the view that law is founded on a conception of
right that is prior to a conception of ethics and that ethical considerations therefore cannot
properly provide a basis for legal analysis. See Weinrib, 87 Colum. L. Rev. at 501-03. For a
critique of Weinrib's legal formalism, see Part IV.
14. Weinrib also invokes Aristotle's conception of corrective justice to support his formalist
account of private law. See, for example, Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev.
403 (1992). For criticism of Weinrib's reliance on Aristotle, see Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on
Political Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 851 (1992), and, from a different perspective, Richard W. Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 625, 683-702 (1992).
15. For Weinrib, as for the libertarians, this structure reflects a particular conception of
liberty-in Weinrib's case, a Kantian conception of the freedom of autonomous individuals. See,
for example, Weinrib, 1 Can. J. L. & Juris. at 16-17 (cited in note 13).
16. In 1964, Catherine Genovese was stabbed to death over a half-hour period in the Kew
Gardens section of New York City while neighbors watched from the safety of their apartments.
Despite her screams and pleas for help, no one called the police during the assault. See Abraham
M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses (McGraw-Hill, 1964); Martin Gansberg, 38 Who Saw
Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. Times 1 (Mar. 17, 1964).
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rape'7--precisely the cases that have generated the greatest public
outcry in recent years.
This common-law duty reflected a more general principle of the
traditional legal system, which held that all individuals were entitled
to protection by the government against violence and injury. In re-
turn for this protection, every individual owed a duty to the state not
merely to obey the law by respecting the rights of others, but also,
when necessary, to actively assist in enforcing the law and maintain-
ing the peace. Ordinarily, of course, the government kept the peace
through its own officers. When no officer was present, however, the
common law held that "every person [is] an officer" for the
preservation of the public peace. 8
This exploration of the common-law position suggests a crucial
insight into the justification for a duty to rescue. Both supporters and
opponents of this duty often approach the problem from a private-law
perspective, that is, in terms of the rights and duties of individuals
viewed as private persons. From this perspective, however, such a
duty is difficult or impossible to find, because private law treats indi-
viduals as private actors who are entitled to pursue their own inter-
ests, as long as they do not infringe the rights of others to do likewise.
The common-law position suggests instead that the strongest starting
point for the construction of a duty to rescue is to be found in public
law, which governs the obligations of citizens toward the community
and its members.
A similar point applies to the imagery of the debate over res-
cue. Academic discussion of the issue tends to focus on Ames's
drowning hypothetical. 19 In that case, the danger arises purely from
natural forces, not from any human agency (apart from the victim's
own conduct). In addition, Ames stipulates that the parties are to be
17. In 1983, a 21-year-old woman was repeatedly raped and assaulted by four men in a bar
in New Bedford, Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 401 Mass. 828, 519 N.E.2d 1320
(1988); Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 401 Mass. 843, 519 N.E.2d 1328 (1988) (affirming convictions
for aggravated rape). According to early police statements and news reports, the attack took
place in front of at least 15 other patrons, none of whom sought to intervene or call the police, and
some of whom even cheered on the assailants. See, for example, The Tavern Rape: Cheers and
No Help, Newsweek 25 (Mar. 21, 1983). Although these initial reports proved exaggerated, see
Jonathan Friendly, The New Bedford Rape Case: Confusion Over Accounts of Cheering at Bar,
N.Y. Times A19 (Apr. 11, 1984), the incident provoked a strong public reaction, and led to the
enactment of legislation in several states requiring bystanders in such cases to at least call the
police. For further discussion of these statutes, see note 66.
18. Matthew Hale, 1 Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown
*489 (photo. reprint 1971) (1736).
19. Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 1). See, for example, Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights Talk 78 (Free Press, 1991); Restatement § 314 cmt. c (cited in note 5); Bender, 38 J. Legal
Educ. at 33-35 (cited in note 5); Epstein, 2 J. Legal Stud. at 189-90 (cited in note 11).
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regarded as strangers having no concrete relation to one another.20
Although Ames himself advocated a duty to rescue, the way in which
he formulated the problem is the most difficult in which initially to
find such a duty. The paradigm case of a duty to rescue, I shall
suggest, is not the drowning stranger but the criminal assault, as in
the Genovese and New Bedford cases. In this situation, in which the
threat arises from wrongful human conduct, it is easier to see that the
parties do have a relationship-one of common citizenship-that can
give rise to a duty to aid.21
Taking the common-law duty to prevent a felony as a starting
point, I turn next to the theoretical foundations of a duty to rescue.
As I show in Part III, this duty finds strong support in the classical
liberal tradition, including Locke's theory of natural rights and the
social contract. According to that theory, government is formed to
protect its citizens against violence. In return for this protection,
citizens undertake to assist the government in enforcing the laws, an
obligation that would extend to preventing a violent crime.2 2
Social contract theory thus provides a philosophical justifica-
tion for a core duty to prevent violence. As developed thus far, this
obligation (like the common-law duty) is limited in two respects.
First, it is owed to the state rather than the victim, resulting in
criminal but not civil liability. Second, the duty is restricted to the
prevention of criminal violence and does not extend to other forms of
harm.
In the remainder of Part III, I show that the liberal tradition
also provides a rationale for expanding the core duty to encompass
both civil liability and noncriminal harm. First, I show that, under
social contract theory, the individual's duty to prevent violence can be
understood to run not only to the community as a whole but also to his
20. Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 1) (specifying that the parties are
"stranger[s]" whose 'only relation [to one another] is that both are human beings").
21. For persuasive criticism of the "stranger' imagery in discussions of the duty to rescue,
see Glendon, Rights Talk at 77 (cited in note 19). In addition to the image of drowning stranger,
the debate over rescue is dominated by the image of the Good Samaritan. See Luke 10:26-37.
This image often is invoked to suggest that the duty to rescue is an inherently moral or religious
one that cannot appropriately be enforced by law. See, for example, Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69
N.H. 257, 44 A. 809, 810 (1897). As this Article argues, however, the strongest basis for a legal
duty to rescue is to be found not in morality but in the obligations of citizenship. On the moral
argument for a duty to rescue, see text accompanying notes 337-41. For further discussion of the
implications of the parable of the Good Samaritan, see note 307.
22. This individual duty is thus a counterpart to the government's duty of protection, which
I have argued elsewhere was a central principle of the American constitutional and legal tradi-
tion, recognized and adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Steven J. Heyman, The First
Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L. J. 507
(1991).
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fellow citizens. Thus, when an individual wrongfully fails to prevent a
criminal assault, he breaches an obligation to the victim as well as to
the state.
In other words, although we began with the public duty recog-
nized by the traditional common law, in its fully developed form the
duty to rescue is not a purely public one. Instead, it is what I shall
call a social duty-an obligation owed not only to the community itself
but also to the other members of that community. Such obligations, I
shall claim, apply as a matter of private as well as public law, giving
rise to tort liability to individuals as well as criminal responsibility to
the state.
Next, I explore the nature of the harms covered by the duty to
rescue. As I show, the natural right tradition gradually developed the
view that the function of the state was not merely to protect against
violence but also to preserve the lives of its members generally.
Accordingly, the individual's duty to act on behalf of the state in an
emergency includes the preservation of life against noncriminal as
well as criminal harm.
Thus, the classical liberal tradition provides a rationale for a
general duty to rescue. According to this view, the community has a
responsibility to protect its members against criminal violence and
other forms of harm. In return, a citizen has a duty to assist in
performing this function by rescuing a fellow citizen in an emergency.
This duty is owed not only to the community itself but also to the
endangered individual, and thus gives rise to both civil and criminal
liability.
In Part IV, I address the legal formalist objection to a duty to
rescue in tort law through an exploration of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, which Weinrib views as containing the purest expression of the
view that private law is negative in character.2 For Hegel, however,
private law is only the first stage in a dialectic that proceeds from law
through morality to community. Although the obligations that derive
from pure private law are negative, those that inhere in morality and
community are positive. As I have suggested, the strongest basis for a
duty to rescue lies in the individual's obligations as a member of the
community. Finally, I argue that, for Hegel, these obligations run not
only to the community itself but also to one's fellow citizens, thereby
giving rise to individual rights that are enforceable within the system
of private law itself. Thus Hegel's thought, like Locke's, supports a
duty to rescue as a matter of both tort and criminal law. Hegel's
23. See Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1286 (cited in note 13).
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discussion of law, morality, and community provides an exceptionally
rich framework for analysis, which confirms and deepens the account
of the duty to rescue set forth in Parts II and III.
In short, this Article develops a theory of the duty to rescue
that draws on the common-law and natural right traditions-the
same sources that are invoked by the historical, liberal, and formalist
arguments in opposition to such a duty. The account that emerges
may be called a liberal-communitarian theory of the duty to rescue. It
is communitarian in that it finds the justification for such a duty in
the individual's responsibility toward the community and in her
relationship with other individuals as members of the community. It
is liberal in emphasizing that one of the community's paramount obli-
gations is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of the indi-
viduals that compose it. In Part V, I state this liberal-communitarian
theory in general terms and contrast it with other leading rationales
for a duty to rescue, including utilitarian, moral, and feminist ap-
proaches.
My object in this Article is to develop a theory of the grounds
for a duty to rescue, rather than to advance a practical proposal for
establishing such a duty. Nevertheless, any such theory would be
incomplete without considering the main features of that duty. Thus,
the Article concludes by outlining the implications of the liberal-com-
munitarian theory for the scope of the duty to rescue and for the
broader legal framework within which it would exist.
This Article is intended as a contribution to the growing body
of work that seeks to understand tort law in terms of right or justice
rather than in instrumental terms.24 At the same time, my hope is to
contribute toward a re-orientation of this approach. Scholars in this
area often seek to understand tort law purely in terms of private right
24. See generally Symposium: Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes
One's Neighbors, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403 (1992). For an extensive listing of recent work in the area,
see Wright, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 627-29 & nn. 6-14 (cited in note 14).
Of course, a large and important body of literature addresses the problem of rescue from more
instrumentalist perspectives, such as utilitarianism and law and economics. See, for example,
Marshall S. Shapo, The Duty to Act, Tort Law, Power, & Public Policy 3-73 (U. of Texas, 1977)
(supporting affirmative duties from a public policy perspective); Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 110,
111-13 (cited in note 1) (advocating a duty to rescue on utilitarian grounds); William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978) (analyzing rescue and related issues in
economic terms); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1986) (exploring rescue from
economic and comparative perspectives); Weinrib, Affirmative Case, 90 Yale L. J. at 280-87 (cited
in note 13) (developing and criticizing a utilitarian argument for a duty to rescue).
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or "corrective justice.'2 5 A more fruitful approach, I shall suggest, is
one that recognizes the interaction between private and public
right-between the rights and obligations of private individuals and
those that inhere in the relationship between citizens and the state.
It is through this approach that we can find the strongest justification
for a legal duty to rescue.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
Nearly all contemporary discussion of the duty to rescue starts
from the premise that the "common law has never imposed liability
either in tort or in criminal law for failures to rescue" (in the absence
of either an undertaking by the defendant or a special relationship).26
This view, however, is seriously misleading. Although no general duty
to rescue existed in private law, the common law often imposed posi-
tive duties as a matter of public law, including a duty to assist in
preventing criminal violence.
A. Misfeasance and Nonfeasance in Private Law
According to the traditional view, the early common law im-
posed tort liability only for misfeasance. As Francis H. Bohlen wrote
in two influential articles, "There is no distinction more deeply rooted
in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfea-
sance and non-feasance."27 "The early law," he asserted,
was a police officer rather than a child's nurse or guardian for the incompe-
tent. While no man was allowed to act so as to injure others, the early law
recognized no general duty of protection. This was quite a different thing: a
conception appropriate to a highly organized civilization. As yet everyone was
regarded as able to protect himself, as responsible for his own safety, the law
25. Ernest Weinrib is the leading exponent of the corrective justice approach. See text
accompanying notes 13-15.
26. Joel Feinberg, 1 The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others 127 (Oxford U.,
1984). See also, for example, Glendon, Rights Talk at 82 (cited in note 19) (observing that
"[a]ffirmative legal duties to come to the aid of another were unknown, not only in early English
law, but to most other primitive legal systems"); Epstein, 2 J. Legal Stud. at 191 (cited in note 11)
(referring to "the general common law.refusal to require men to be good Samaritans"); Charles 0.
Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in James M. Ratcliffe, ed.,
The Good Samaritan and the Law 23, 23-24 (Anchor Books, 1966) (asserting, "Our common law
has always refused to transmute moral duties into legal duties.... [I]t is clear at common law
that nobody has to lift a finger-let alone spend a dime and dial a phone number or actually
render aid-to help a stranger in peril or distress.") (citations omitted).
27. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, in Bohlen,
Studies in the Law of Torts at 293 (cited in note 8).
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merely saw that he was not interfered with from without He must take his
own precautions, take upon himself the risks of what he may choose to do.
Therefore, a mere failure to protect another from a threatened injury ... was
not actionable unless some obligation had been intentionally assumed.28
This view of the common-law attitude toward nonfeasance was
based in part on the traditional theory of the development of trespass
and case, the common-law forms of action that ultimately gave rise to
the modern law of torts.29 According to that theory, the only wrongs
that early law was capable of recognizing were those resulting from
direct force. For such injuries, the common-law remedy was an action
of trespass, a category that included wrongs against the plaintiffs
person and goods as well as his land. In the late fourteenth century,
however, the common-law courts began to allow a new form of action,
known as "trespass on the case" or simply "case." On the traditional
view, this new form of action represented "a development from tres-
pass, a conscious reaching out from the central idea of direct forcible
injury."30 Although trespass on the case allowed recovery for indirect
wrongs, such as the creation of dangerous conditions, it nevertheless
followed trespass in requiring that the harm have been caused by the
defendant's wrongful act.31 Thus, according to the traditional view,
misfeasance continued to be fundamental to the early conception of
tort.
Contemporary historical scholarship has decisively challenged
this view of the rise of trespass and case, contributing to a revised
understanding of the common-law position on misfeasance and non-
feasance. As S.F.C. Milsom and others have shown, it was not until
the eighteenth century that the test for trespass was defined in terms
of direct forcible injury.32 In the early common law, "trespass" simply
meant transgression or wrong.33 As a general rule, however, the only
28. Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations, in Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts at 37-38
(emphasis in original) (cited in note 8).
29. For an account of the traditional theory and its connection with the view that the
common law imposed no liability for nonfeasance, see S.F.C. Milsom, Not Doing Is No Trespass: A
View of the Boundaries of Case, 1954 Camb. L. J. 105, reprinted in S.F.C. Milsom, Studies in the
History of the Common Law 91 (Hambledon, 1985). For further criticism of the traditional theory,
see S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law ch. 11 (Butterworths, 2d ed. 1981).
30. Milsom, Historical Foundations at 284,309.
31. Milsom, 1954 Camb. L. J. at 107, reprinted in Milsom, History of the Common Law at 93
(cited in note 29).
32. See Milsom, Historical Foundations at 283, 312 (cited in note 29). The question was
finally resolved in Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
33. Milsom, Historical Foundations at 285 (cited in note 29). As Professor Baker observes,
the use of "trespass" in this sense resembles its use in the traditional English translation of the
Lord's Prayer ("forgive us our trespasses"). J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History
71 (Butterworths, 3d ed. 1990).
1994] 683
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
trespass actions that could be brought in the king's courts were those
alleging a breach of the king's peace. For all other wrongs, subjects
had to seek a remedy in the system of local courts.3 4 This restriction
did not reflect a substantive conception of the nature of wrongs, but
simply a jurisdictional limitation on the king's courts.35  When this
limitation was abolished in the late fourteenth century, legal wrongs
in general became actionable in the common-law courts-in an action
of trespass if a breach of the peace was alleged, otherwise in an action
on the case.3 6
Because actions of trespass were predicated on a breach of the
peace, they typically involved misfeasance. Actions on the case, by
contrast, imposed liability for nonfeasance as well, in situations in
which a plaintiff could show injury resulting from the defendant's
breach of an affirmative duty to act. In most instances, such duties
were based on an undertaking by the defendant.37 In a few contexts,
however, affirmative duties were imposed by law or by custom having
the force of law. For example, innkeepers were obligated to accept
travelers and to safeguard their goods against theft.38 Landowners
had a duty to repair river or sea walls adjoining their property to
protect against floods.39 These two examples hold particular interest
for our purposes, for they involve affirmative obligations imposed on
individuals for the benefit of the public and its members, the breach of
which gave rise to liability in tort.4°
Thus, misfeasance was less fundamental to early tort law than
the traditional view supposed. Nevertheless, liability for nonfeasance
in the absence of an undertaking was exceptional. In particular, the
34. See Milsom, Historical Foundations at 286-88,300 (cited in note 29).
35. Baker, Legal History at 72 (cited in note 33). See also Milsom, Historical Foundations
at 284, 300 (cited at note 29).
36. See Baker, Legal History at 464 (cited in note 33). As Professor Milsom notes, however,
the decision to entertain actions on the case did not mean that every kind of action could be
brought before the king's courts; defamation, for example, remained a matter of local jurisdiction
until the sixteenth century. Milsom, Historical Foundations at 293 (cited in note 29).
37. See Baker, Legal History at 459-61 (cited in note 33).
38. See id.; J.H. Baker and S.F.C. Milsom, Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to
1750 at 347 n.1 (Butterworths, 1986) (discussing the development of innkeeper liability for
refusing travelers). Beginning in the seventeenth century, similar duties were imposed on
common carriers. Baker, Legal History at 462 (cited in note 33). Both innkeepers and common
carriers were held to a strict standard of liability for loss of goods. Id.
39. See Milsom, Historical Foundations at 301-04 (cited in note 29).
40. That these duties were imposed for the benefit of individuals, and not only for that of
the community at large, is suggested by the language of the writs brought in these cases. For ex-
ample, the writ might allege that the defendant had a duty to keep his river wall in repair "so that
his neighbours come to no harm by his default." Id. at 303. For an example of such a case, see
Bernardeston v. Heighlynge (1344), in Baker and Milsom, Sources at 338 (cited in note 38).
684 [47:673
1994] DUTY TO RESCUE 685
common law apparently imposed no duty, as a matter of private law,
to rescue another from harm .41
B. The Public-Law Duty to Prevent Criminal Violence
In contrast to private law, public law often imposed positive
duties. In particular, the traditional common law recognized an obli-
gation-or rather a family of related obligations-to prevent criminal
violence.
Most relevant here is the traditional principle that every sub-
ject had a legal duty to prevent a felony. This doctrine may be traced
as far back as Bracton in the mid-thirteenth century.4 When
discussing the criminal responsibility of various participants in
homicide, Bracton observes that an individual "who, though he could
rescue a man from death, failed to do so," is free neither from guilt nor
from punishment.4
In early modern times, the duty to prevent a felony is sup-
ported by a relatively strong line of authority beginning with the first
modern treatise on criminal law, Sir William Staunford's Les Plees del
Coron.44 A typical statement of the rule appears in Sir William
Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown, an important eighteenth-century trea-
tise:
Those who by accident are barely present when a Felony is committed, and
are merely passive, and neither [in] any Way encourage it, nor endeavor to
hinder it, nor to apprehend the Offenders, shall neither be adjudged
Principals nor Accessaries; yet if they be of full Age, they are highly punish-
41. See Baker, Legal History at 470 (cited in note 33) (stating that "[a] man may know that
his neighbour is in distress, but he is not bound in law to go and help him").
42. See generally George E. Woodbine, ed., Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard U., 1968) ("Bracton).
43. 2 id., fo. 121 at 342 (stating, "Not only is he who strikes and slays liable, but he who
orders him to strike and slay, for since they are not free of guilt, they ought not to be free of
punishment; nor ought he to be free who, though he could rescue a man from death, failed to do so
(Nec etiam ille qui cum posset hominem a morte liberare non liberavit)").
44. See William Staunford, Les Plees del Coron ch. 45 at 40b (photo. reprint 1971) (1557),
translated in Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961] 3 All E.R. 33, 37 (judgment of Lord
Denning):
If anyone happens to be present, when another is killed, or when a felony is committed,
and did not come there in the company of the felons, nor was part of their confederacy,
but nevertheless did not intervene, or disturb the felons, or raise hue and cry, he is not on
that account to be held a principal or accessory, for it is not a felony in him but only an
offense for which he can be fined like trespass.
Earlier in the work, Staunford quotes in full Bracton's chapter on homicide, including the
statement on the responsibility of one who fails to rescue a man from death. See Staunford, Les
Plees del Coron at 11b-13a.
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able by fine and imprisonment for their Negligence, both in not endeavoring
to prevent the Felony, and in not endeavoring to apprehend the Offender. 45
Similarly, in his own great work on the criminal law, Sir
Matthew Hale observes that "every man is bound to use all possible
lawful means to prevent a felony," as long as he can do so "without
hazard of himself."'' If he does not, he is subject to fine and impris-
onment.47 This offense, which sometimes was classified as a species of
misprision of felony,48 was recognized by many other leading writers
as well.
49
The treatises of Staunford, Hawkins, Hale, and others played a
major role in the development of English criminal law, and still are
regarded by the English courts as important authorities in determin-
ing what the common law of crime was.w° These writers therefore
45. William Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 29, § 10 at 313 (photo.
reprint 1978) (1716) (citations omitted).
46. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *484 (cited in note 18).
47. Id.
48. Treatise writers beginning with Staunford defined the offense of misprision of felony as
failure to disclose the commission of a felony. See, for example, Staunford, Les Plees del Coron at
37b (cited in note 44); Edward Coke, 3 Institutes of the Laws of England *139; William
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *121. Some writers classified the failure to
prevent a felony as a species of misprision of felony. See, for example, Michael Dalton, The
Countrey Justice 258 (photo. reprint 1973) (1619); Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the
Criminal Law §§ 652, 655 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1868). For some historical discusssions of
misprision of felony, see Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961] 3 All E.R. 33; C.K. Allen,
Misprision, 78 L. Q. Rev. 40, 49-54 (1962); P.R. Glazebrook, Misprision of Felony-Shadow or
Phantom, 8 Am. J. Legal Hist. 189,283 (1964).
49. See William Lambard, Eirenarcha, or Of the Office of the Justices of the Peace bk. 2, ch.
7 at 289 (rev., corr. and enlarged ed. 1614); Dalton, The Countrey Justice at 258 (cited in note 48);
Michael Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission of Oyer and Terminer and Goal
Delivery for the Trial of the Rebels in the Year 1746 in the County of Surry, and of Other Crown
Cases. To Which Are Added Discourses Upon a Few Branches of the Crown Law discourse 3, ch.
1, § 5 at 350 (photo. reprint 1982) (1762) ("Crown Law'); Edward Hyde East, 1 A Treatise on the
Pleas of the Crown ch. 5, § 58 at 290 (1803); Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Criminal Law §§ 652-
55 (cited in note 48).
A variant of the rule seems to have applied when the violence amounted merely to an affray
or public fight rather than a felony. According to several writers, "it is the Duty of every Man to
interpose in such Cases for preserving the Publick Peace and preventing Mischief.' Foster,
Crown Law at discourse 2, ch. 2, § 4 at 272. See also Dalton, The Countrey Justice at 28; James
Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Robert G. McCloskey, ed., 2 The Works of James Wilson 681, 682-83
(Harvard U., 1967) (citing Foster). To avert an escalation of the violence, however, it was
sometimes said that those who intervened were not permitted to harm the afrayors. See, for
example, Dalton, The Countrey Justice at 28. In addition, these writers do not specify whether a
bystander who failed to intervene was subject to legal punishment. When an affray resulted in
death, however, there was authority that bystanders were liable to punishment, presumably on
the ground that they breached a duty to prevent a felony. See text accompanying note 52.
50. For example, in Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961] 3 All E.R. 33, the House of
Lords ruled that failure to report a felony constituted an offense at common law, relying in large
part on the treatises of Staunford, Hale, and other authors.
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provide considerable support for the view that the common law im-
posed a duty to prevent a felony.
Although the case law is scanty, this duty finds judicial support
as well.51 In a homicide case near the turn of the seventeenth century,
the Chief Justice of the King's Bench is reported to have said that "if
two be fighting, and there are more looking on, who do not endeavour
to part them; if one be kill'd, the lookers on may be indicted and fined
to the King."52
The duty to prevent a felony was merely one instance of a more
general obligation of subjects to assist in preserving the peace.- It
was well established, for example, that an individual who was present
when a felony was committed had a duty to attempt to apprehend the
felon. 54 If he was unable to do so on his own, he was required to raise
hue and cry,5 5 and all those of full age were bound to follow hue and
cry to apprehend the felon.5
Subjects also were required to cooperate with the authorities
responsible for keeping the peace. For example, every individual was
required to render assistance when so requested by a peace officer to
51. As the passage from Staunford suggests, see note 44, the duty to prevent a felony was
closely related to the duty to raise hue and cry to apprehend the offender. Thus, it is possible that
among the many medieval cases imposing liability for failure to raise hue and cry, some were
based in whole or in part on failure to act to prevent the crime.
52. Note, Noy 50, 74 Eng. Rep. 1019 (K.B. n.d.). Chief Justice Popham made the statement;
another justice, Yelverton, agreed. The reporter identifies the case as R. v. Wilburn, but does not
indicate the term or date of the case. The case appears among several decisions from the 44th
and 45th years of the reign of Elizabeth I, or 1601 to 1603, suggesting that the case dates from
approximately the same period.
Fitzherbert's Abridgement contains a note of a Year Book case from the early fourteenth
century that appears to support the duty to prevent a felony. Anthony Fitzherbert, Le Graunde
Abridgement 3 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1329-30), tit. Corone, pl. 293 (1514-16).
According to Fitzherbert's digest of the case, a man was amerced because he had been present
when another had been killed and had not rescued the victim. In the original Year Book report
upon which Fitzherbert's note was based, however, the court asked the inquest whether they
'suspected* ('mescrustrent') the man of any guilt, not whether he had 'not rescued* (ne resec")
the victim. Donald W. Sutherland, ed., Y.B. 3-4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1329-30), 97-
98 Selden Society 176.77 (1983). The account in Fitzherbert's Abridgement most likely reflects an
error in transcription or printing. Thus, the Abridgement case cannot be regarded as a judicial
decision imposing liability for failure to prevent a felony. For a translation and analysis of these
Law French texts, I am grateful to Jacob I. Corr6.
53. See, for example, Charge of Tindal, L.C.J., to the Bristol Grand Jury (Jan. 2, 1832)
(discussing the extent of the 'obligation and... authority to preserve the peace of the King* that
is 'imposed by the law on every subject of the realm"), quoted in Rex v. Pinney, 172 Eng. Rep. 962,
966-67 n.(b) (KB. 1832).
54. See, for example, Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *439, *448-49, *484, *588 (cited in note
18); 2 id. at *75-76; Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 12, § 1 at 74 (cited in note
45); id. ch. 29, § 10 at 313.
55. See, for example, Hale, 2 Pleas of the Crown at *76 (cited in note 18); Hawkins, 2 A
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 12, § 5 at 75 (cited in note 45).
56. See, for example, Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *618 (cited in note 18); 2 id. at *104;
Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 12, § 4 at 75 (cited in note 45).
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suppress an affray or a riot or to apprehend an offender. 57 When a
person knew that a felony had been committed, he was obligated to
report this crime to the authorities;5 according to some writers, the
same rule applied to a felony that one knew would occur in the fu-
ture.59
The duty to assist in keeping the peace reflected a general
conception of the rights and obligations of subjects under the common
law. According to traditional doctrine, every subject owed allegiance
or obedience to the sovereign, while the sovereign was under a
reciprocal obligation to protect his subjects against violence and
wrong.60 For the most part, of course, responsibility for conserving the
peace was entrusted to officers appointed by the king for that pur-
pose.61 In many situations, however, criminal violence could be pre-
vented or offenders apprehended only by officers with the assistance of
private individuals, or even by the latter alone. In such instances, it
was held that "the law makes every person an officer" with the
authority and duty to uphold the peace. 62  This duty constituted an
important element of the allegiance owed by the subject in return for
the protection that he received under the law.63
57. See, for example, Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *495, *588 (cited in note 18); 2 id. at *86.
87; D.E.C. Yale, ed., Sir Matthew Hale's The Prerogatives of the King, 92 Selden Society 61 (1976)
("Hale, Prerogatives").
58. See, for example, Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *618 (cited in note 18).
59. Lambard, Eirenarcha bk. 2, ch. 7 at 289 (cited in note 49); Dalton, The Countrey Justice
at 211-12, 260 (cited in note 48); Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 29, § 23 at
317 (cited in note 45).
60. See Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 4b-5a, 8a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382, 386 (1608); Coke, 1
Institutes at *130a (cited in note 48). See also Heyman, 41 Duke L. J. at 513 (cited in note 22).
61. See, for example, Lambard, Eirenarcha at ch. 3 (cited in note 49); Blackstone, 1
Commentaries at *349-59 (cited in note 48).
62. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *489 (cited in note 18) (noting that when a felon cannot be
arrested without killing him, this act is justifiable even if done by a private subject, "for in such
case the law makes every person an officer to apprehend a felon"). For other examples, see
Dalton, The Countrey Justice at 265 (cited in note 48) (stating that 'every man is a sufficient
Bailiffe and Officer to apprehend him that is pursued by huy [sic] & cry); Hale, 1 Pleas of the
Crown at *485 (noting that in "case of a felony attempted, as well as of a felony committed, every
man is thus far an officer, that at least his killing of the attempter in case of necessity" is
justifiable, to the same extent as if done in self-defense); 2 id. at *76 (stating that when a person
has committed a felony and A knows it, he has a duty to arrest the felon, "for the law in this case
makes A an officer"); id. at *77 (remarking that "the law makes him an officer in this case, as well
as if he were a justice of peace or constable"); Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum 83-84
(1609), quoted in Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation and the Criminal Law in
Seventeenth-Century England 70 (Cambridge U., 1987) (observing that "every English man is a
Sergeant to take [a] thief").
63. See, for example, 4 Bracton fo. 444b at 378 (cited in note 42) (indicating that "all who
are in the allegiance (ad fidem) of the lord king" have an obligation to arrest one who has
committed a capital crime); Accessory, 72 Eng. Rep. 402-03 (K.B. 1550) (per Harris, Sit.)
(recognizing "the duty of every man on his allegiance of revealing felonies") ('le duty de chescu
home sur son allegiance de discoverer felonies"). Compare Hale, Prerogatives at 61 n.2 (cited in
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Over time, the traditional approach of requiring citizens to
assist in law enforcement fell largely into disuse. A major reason for
this change was the development, beginning in the nineteenth
century, of modern police forces with responsibility for the prevention
of crime.6 4  In recent decades, however, society has become
increasingly aware that the prevention of crime cannot be adequately
achieved through reliance on the police alone, but also may require
efforts on the part of the broader community.65 This recognition is
reflected in the adoption by several states of laws requiring
individuals who are present at the scene of a violent crime to notify
the police or provide other assistance to the victim. 66 Thus the history
that we have explored in this Part has renewed relevance to
contemporary problems.
Two important points emerge from this history. First, it ap-
pears to critically undermine the conventional view that the common
law never imposed affirmative obligations to prevent harm to others.
Second, the common-law position suggests that the strongest ground
for a duty to rescue lies not in private but in public law, which focuses
note 57) (recognizing that the duty of allegiance includes 'assisting and defending ... the realm
against violence, rebellion and invasion).
64. On the creation of modern police forces, see, for example, Lawrence Meir Friedman,
Crime and Punishment in American History 67-71 (Basic Books, 1993).
65. See, for example, Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir.
1970), discussed in the text accompanying notes 388-91.
66. Five states-Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington-recently
have enacted legislation requiring individuals who witness violent crimes to notify the police. See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992) (enacted 1984); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 268, § 40 (West
1990) (enacted 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22(A) (Baldwin 1992) (enacted 1972); R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (Supp. 1993) (enacted 1983); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100 (West
1988) (enacted 1970). The Florida and Rhode Island statutes apply only to sexual assaults; the
remaining three laws apply to felonies or violent crimes in general. Wisconsin has adopted a
somewhat broader provision, under which one who knows that a crime is being committed has a
duty to summon law enforcement or other assistance or to "provide assistance to the victim"
directly. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2) (West Supp. 1991). Three states, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
and Vermont, have gone further, imposing a general duty to provide "reasonable assistance" to
any person exposed to grave physical harm. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (Supp. 1993) (enacted 1984);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.05 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1983); 12 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 519 (1973)
(enacted 1967). These duty-to.report and duty-to-aid laws generally provide that the obligation
applies only when it can be performed without danger to oneself or others. Violation of these
duties typically constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by fine and, in some states, imprisonment.
Compare Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-115 (West 1990) (declaring that every person has a duty to
report suspected crimes to law enforcement authorities, but imposing no sanctions for failing to do
so). As the enactment dates suggest, many of these statutes were passed in response to the New
Bedford rape. See, for example, Wendy Fox, Brother's Keeper by Force of Law? Issue of Requiring
Witnesses to Report Crime Is a Complex One, Boston Globe 24 (Apr. 3, 1983) (describing the
legislative response to the New Bedford incident); Clara Germani, State Laws Seek to Boost the
'Good Samaritan" in Citizens, Christian Sci. Monitor 3 (Sept. 22, 1983) (same). For a valuable
discussion of these statutes and the experience of states under them, see Daniel B. Yeager, A
Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71
Wash. U. L. Q. 1, 5-8,20-38 (1993).
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on the rights and duties of individuals as members of the community.
The duty to prevent a felony was a matter of public law in a two-fold
sense: it was a legal duty that was owed to the sovereign and thus
was enforceable by criminal penalties rather than civil damages, and
it applied only to the prevention of criminal violence, rather than
other forms of harm. Although it was limited in these two respects,
the common-law rule was hardly insignificant. It would have imposed
an obligation to act in precisely those situations that have become
most notorious in recent years-cases in which an individual has been
violently attacked while bystanders do nothing to interfere or to sum-
mon the authorities. 6 Thus, the common-law position may provide a
starting point for the development of a more general theory of the
duty to rescue.
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS I: EARLY NATURAL RIGHT THEORY
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Turning now from the historical to the theoretical foundations
of a duty to rescue, this Part explores the thought of Locke and other
writers in the classical liberal tradition. This tradition had, and
continues to have, such a deep influence on Anglo-American law that
it inevitably tends to shape the way that we debate the problem of
rescue. It is often thought, however, that this tradition rejects
positive rights and obligations with respect to others. In this Part, I
shall attempt to show, on the contrary, that liberal natural rights
theory not only provides strong support for a core public-law duty to
prevent violence, but also suggests a basis for transforming that
obligation into a more general duty to rescue-a duty that is not
limited to criminal harms, and that is enforceable in tort as well as
criminal law.
A. The Duty to Prevent Criminal Violence
1. The Public Duty
Following earlier writers, Locke begins his analysis with the
state of nature, the condition that would exist prior to the formation of
civil society and government. By nature all individuals are free and
67. See notes 16 and 17 and accompanying text.
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equal. 8  Locke defines natural liberty as the freedom to dispose of
one's person, actions, and possessions as one thinks fit, without de-
pending on the will of any other individual.69 Natural equality con-
sists in the absence of "Subordination or Subjection," and in the equal
right of all individuals to their natural liberty.70
As Locke emphasizes, natural freedom does not confer an
arbitrary right to act as one pleases, but instead is liberty under law."
The law that both protects and bounds natural liberty is the law of
nature, which Locke identifies with reason.72  Precisely because
individuals are naturally free and equal, the law of nature forbids one
person to deprive another of his life, liberty, or property.73
For Locke, however, the obligations of natural law are not
merely negative. The function of natural law is to direct human be-
ings toward their natural good, 4 which consists above all in the pres-
ervation of their being. Human beings, however, are not merely indi-
viduals but also members of a species who share a common nature.75
The foundation and end of the law of nature is therefore the general
preservation of mankind.76  Accordingly, Locke holds that an
individual has a natural duty to preserve not only his own life but also
the lives of others:
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself... ; so by the like reason when
his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can,
to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an
Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of
the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another. 77
68. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government bk. 2, § 4 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge U.,
1988) (3d ed. 1698).
69. Id.
70. Id. §S 4, 54.
71. Id.§§6,22.
72. Id. § 6.
73. Id.
74. Describing the nature of law in general, Locke asserts that "Law, in its true Notion, is
not so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest,
and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under the Law. Could they be
happier without it, the Law, as a useless thing would of it self vanish.' Id. § 57 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the function of law in general is to direct human beings toward the good. In the
case of natural law, this is the natural good of mankind, while in the case of positive law, it is the
public good of the society. See id. §§ 3, 131, 135. See also id. § 229 (asserting that f[t]he end of
Government is the good of Mankind').
75. See, for example, id. bk. 1, § 67; id. bk. 2, §§ 4,6.
76. In his early work on natural law, Locke stresses that the law of nature is founded not on
individual self-preservation but on the preservation of mankind. See John Locke, Questions
Concerning the Law of Nature qu. 8, fol. 82 at 203 (Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and
Diskin Clay, eds. & trans., Cornell U., 1990); id. qu. 11, fol. 105-18 at 235.51.
77. Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 6 (emphasis in original) (cited in note 68).
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Thus, for Locke, the fundamental law of nature is the positive
command to preserve mankind.78 Indeed, in this passage Locke ap-
pears to derive the obligation Aot to harm others from this more fun-
damental positive requirement.
Locke does not clearly specify the ways in which individuals
are obligated to preserve mankind. The context, however, suggests
that he is referring in part to his theory of "the Executive Power of the
Law of Nature."7 9 According to this doctrine, in a state of nature every
individual has the power to enforce natural law by restraining and
punishing offenses against that law.80 In addition to the right of pun-
ishment, which is shared by all, the particular victim is entitled to
reparation for the injury he has suffered.8 This is the natural origin
of criminal and tort law, respectively.
Of course, Locke, like other natural right theorists, did not
regard the state of nature as one in which human beings could flour-
ish or even survive for long. Rather, the state of nature provides the
normative background for the construction of a legitimate state, one
that is founded on the consent of its members and that secures their
natural rights. As an actual condition, on the other hand, the state of
nature would be subject to grave defects. It would lack both an estab-
lished law to govern controversies between individuals and a known
and impartial judge to apply that law.82 Moreover, individuals often
would lack power to protect their own rights.3 And although others
may have a natural duty to render assistance, people are apt to be
remiss when the interests of others are involved.8
These practical difficulties reflect deeper conceptual problems.
According to Locke, by the law of nature all of mankind constitutes
one community.8 5 In enforcing the law of nature, an individual may
78. On the preservation of mankind as the fundamental law of nature, see id. §§ 16, 134,
135, 149, 159, 171, 183. In his Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke observes that "if the
preservation of all Mankind, as much as in him lies, were every one's persuasion, as indeed it is
every one's Duty, and the true Principle to regulate our Religion, Politicks and Morality by, the
World would be much quieter, and better natur'd than it is." John Locke, Some Thoughts
Concerning Education § 116 at 180 (John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton eds., Clarendon, 1989) (3d
ed. 1695). For analysis of these passages in the Two Treatises and Education, see Nathan Tarcov,
Locke's Education for Liberty 167-69, 251 n.148 (U. of Chicago, 1984).
79. Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 13 (emphasis deleted) (cited in note 68).
80. Id. 33 7-12.
81. Id. §§ 10-11.
82. Id. §§ 124-25.
83. Id. §§ 123, 126.
84. See id. § 125. Locke states, "For every one in that state [of nature] being both Judge
and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is
very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own Cases; as well as negligence,
and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss, in other Mens." Id.
85. Id. § 128.
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be regarded as acting on behalf of this "great and natural Community"
to preserve its members against violence.s The defects of the state of
nature-the absence of publicly recognized law, adjudication, and
enforcement-result from relying solely upon individuals to perform
these essentially public functions.
For Locke and the modern natural right tradition, the solution
to these problems lies in the social contract, in which individuals agree
to leave the state of nature and to form a civil society "for the mutual
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates."'8 7  Through this
compact, every individual transfers his power of enforcing the law of
nature to the community, which thereby assumes an obligation to
protect the rights of all of its members.s Although this obligation
arises from the social contract, it ultimately reflects the law of nature.
As applied to the community, "the first and fundamental natural Law"
is "the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the
publick good) of every person in it."9
The main outlines of social contract theory are, of course, famil-
iar. For the purposes of this Article, it is crucial to focus on the spe-
cific rights and obligations that arise from that compact. According to
Locke, the individuals who form the society gain the right to be pro-
tected by it in their life, liberty, and property.90 To obtain this protec-
tion, each individual not only consents to obey the laws made by the
community for the protection of its members, but also "engages his
natural force ... to assist the Executive Power of the Society" in the
enforcement of those laws, to the extent required by law.91 In this
way, the rights of individuals come to be defended by "the united
strength of the whole Society."92
Locke was not the only writer to formulate the social contract
in these terms. It was a basic doctrine of contract theory, shared by
authors as diverse as Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau, that indi-
viduals committed their force to the society or the sovereign so that
86. Id. §§ 8, 11, 128.
87. Id. § 123 (emphasis in original).
88. See id. §§ 130-31.
89. Id. § 134 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.§ 130.
91. Id. See also id. §§ 88-89.
92. Id. § 136. See also John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 26 (James H. Tully, ed.,
Hackett, 1983) (William Popple trans., 1689) (observing that 'the Magistrate is armed with the
Force and Strength of all his Subjects, in order to the punishment of those that violate any other
Man's Rights").
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individual rights could be protected by the combined force of all the
members of society.9 3
Classical social contract theory thus provides a philosophical
framework in which we can understand the traditional common-law
duty of individuals to prevent criminal violence. According to that
theory, the state has an obligation to protect each citizen against
violence. In many cases, however, the state cannot provide adequate
protection without the assistance of individuals. In such cases, citi-
zens have an obligation to assist the state in preventing violence.
When an individual fails to fulfill this obligation, he violates a public
duty owed to the state and therefore may be subject to criminal liabil-
ity.
Several leading eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers on
criminal law understood the common-law rule in much this way. In
his Lectures on Law in 1790, James Wilson, the framer and Supreme
Court Justice, presented a natural rights account of American law in
which he strongly praised the common-law duty to prevent crimes.9 4
In this regard, Wilson followed the English jurist Sir Michael Foster,
who declared that "the Duty of every Man to interpose in such Cases
for preserving the Publick Peace" was "founded in the Principles of
Social Duty and Political Justice."95 As Joel Prentiss Bishop wrote in
his mid-nineteenth-century treatise on American criminal law, one
who wrongfully failed to prevent a felony was held to be "guilty of a
breach of the duty due from every man to the community in which he
dwells, and the government which protects him. 96
93. See Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The English Version ch. 5, §§ 8-9, 11 (Howard Warrender,
ed., Clarendon, 1983) (1651); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 18 at 120-21 (Richard Tuck, ed.,
Cambridge U., 1991) (1651); id. ch. 28 at 214; Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium
Libri Octo bk. 7, ch. 2, § 1 at 968 (C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather, trans., Clarendon, 1934)
(1688) (Volume 2 of the Classics of International Law edition) ("Law of Nature'); id. § 5 at 972-73;
id. § 13 at 984; id. ch. 3, § 1 at 1000; id. ch. 4, § 3 at 1012; id. bk. 8, ch. 3, § 1 at 1159; Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, The Social Contract bk. 1, ch. 6, in Ernest Barker, ed., Social Contract: Essays by
Locke, Hume, and Rousseau 179-82 (Greenwood, 1980); id. ch. 9 at 186. See also Blackstone, 1
Commentaries at *251 (cited in note 48) (observing that civil liberty consists in "protecting the
rights of individuals by the united force of society").
94. See Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Mcloskey, ed., 2 The Works of James Wilson at 680.83
(cited in note 49). "In every citizen," Wilson declared, "much more in every publick officer of peace
and justice, the whole authority of the law is vested ...for the all-important purpose of
preventing crimes. From every citizen, much more from every publick officer of peace and justice,
the law demands the performance of that duty." Id. at 681. The variant of the rule that Wilson
mentions is the duty to part the combatants in an affray without using violence oneself. See id. at
682-83.
95. Foster, Crown Law at 272 (cited in note 49).
96. Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 655 at 374 (cited in note 48).
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2. The Duty to Individuals
Although the common law imposed a duty to prevent violence,
that duty was owed exclusively to the state. In addition to providing a
theoretical basis for this duty, Lockean social contract theory also
suggests a rationale for transforming it into an obligation to individu-
als as well, and thus enforceable through civil as well as criminal
liability.
As we have seen, the common law held that every subject was
entitled to protection by the sovereign. In return, the subject owed a
duty of allegiance that required him, among other things, to assist the
sovereign in enforcing the laws through which protection was
affordedY This structure of rights and obligations can be represented
as follows:
Sovereign
allegiance allegiance
protectio proetn
Rescuer (R) Victim (V)
Figure 1. The Common-Law Model
Under this model, the sovereign has an obligation to the poten-
tial victim, V, to protect her against violent assault, while a potential
rescuer, R, has a duty to the sovereign to assist in providing this pro-
tection. R's duty, however, is owed solely to the sovereign, not to V. A
97. See text accompanying notes 60-63.
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breach of this duty therefore gives rise to criminal responsibility to the
sovereign, but not civil liability to the victim.
This structure of rights and duties reflects the political theory
underlying the common-law model.9 8 According to that theory, the
fundamental political bond is that between sovereign and subject.
The relationship of subjects to one another is derivative, based on
their status as subjects of the same ruler. Thus, the positive obliga-
tions that arise from fundamental political relationships-such as
duties of aid and protection-run only between sovereign and subject,
not between one subject and another.
Now consider the social contract model, which can be repre-
sented as follows:
State
allegiance
Rescuer (R)
-protection
The social contr
\ protection
'00 Victim(V)
act
Figure 2. The Social Contract Model
Like the common-law model, social contract theory recognizes a recip-
rocal relationship between the citizen and the state. In contractarian
theory, however, this relationship rests on a deeper and more
98. For a classic statement of this political theory, see Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng.
Rep. 377 (1608). A valuable discussion of this theory may be found in James H. Kettner, The
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 at 7-8, 16-28 (U. of N.C., 1978).
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fundamental relationship, the bond between the citizens themselves.
This bond is formed by the social contract, in which individuals agree
with one another to form a community. The most fundamental
political obligations that citizens have are those that they have
assumed toward one another through the social contract. When an
individual breaches his obligations under that contract, he violates a
duty owed to the other individuals who have consented to it.9
As we have seen, individuals enter into society for mutual
protection. Through the social contract, each individual agrees to
relinquish his power to enforce the law of nature on his own authority,
but at the same time commits himself to assist the state in enforcing
the law, insofar as the law directs him to do so.100 This commitment is
made to the other individuals who are parties to the social contract,
and is made for their benefit, to ensure that the community will have
sufficient power to protect each of its members. Under this model,
when R fails to render aid as required by law, he violates a duty not
only to the state but also to V. It is consonant with this model that he
should be responsible not merely to the community through its crimi-
nal law, but also to the injured party in a civil action.
We can approach the issue of civil liability from another angle
as well. Because the fundamental question is whether the breach of a
public-law duty can result in private liability, the problem can be
analyzed by analogy to the tort-law doctrine of statutory negligence or
negligence per se. Suppose that a jurisdiction enacts a criminal stat-
ute requiring every citizen to aid in preventing a crime of violence if
she can do so without substantial risk to herself (for example, by noti-
fying the police). Subsequently, R fails to act to prevent a criminal
assault on V, who suffers injury as a result. Under the doctrine of
statutory negligence, V can recover damages against R only if the
statute is held to impose a duty for the protection or benefit of the
class of persons to which V belongs, that is, potential victims of crimi-
nal violence.1°1 Under the common-law model, this would not be the
case: the statute would be enforcing a duty that the individual owed
only to the state, not to other individuals. Some positivist and utili-
tarian views would reach the same result, on the ground that the
purpose of the statute is not to secure any right owed by the state to
99. See, for example, Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 97 (cited in note 68).
100. See text accompanying note 91.
101. See Restatement §§ 286,288 (cited in note 5).
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the victim, but rather to promote public order for the benefit of the
community as a whole. 0 2
In contrast to these views, the social contract model would hold
that the purpose of the statute is not merely to promote social welfare
but to protect the right of individuals to be secure against violence. In
imposing a duty to prevent violence, the statute is not simply creating
a positive-law duty toward the state; instead, it is enforcing an under-
lying obligation that runs directly from R to V under the social con-
tract-an obligation that reflects a more fundamental natural duty to
prevent violence. On this model, the statute would impose a duty for
the protection or benefit of potential victims of criminal violence.
Under the doctrine of statutory negligence, a breach of the statute
therefore could give rise to liability in tort.
A striking example of a law imposing civil liability for breach of
a duty to protect against violence is provided by section 6 of the Ku
Klux Act of 1871.103 The Act was adopted during Reconstruction to
protect the rights of the newly freed slaves and their supporters
against the wave of terrorism that swept the South after the Civil
War.104 Section 6 affords those injured by specified forms of racial and
political violence a federal action for damages against "any person"
who knew of and had the ability to prevent the attack but neglected to
do so.105 The congressional debate over section 6 indicates that the
provision was premised on the fundamental obligation of the commu-
nity and its members to protect against violence.1°6 Echoing the com-
mon-law tradition, the Senate manager of the legislation, George F.
102. For a classic statement of the positivist position, see Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on
the Law of Torts ch. 13 (Callaghan, 1879).
103. Ku Klux Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 15, codified with minor changes at 42 U.S.C. §
1986 (1988).
104. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 at 425-44,
454-55 (Harper & Row, 1988).
105. Section 6 as enacted provided:
That any person or persons, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done and mentioned in the second section of this act [now 42 U.S.C. § 1985, forbidding, in-
ter alia, conspiracies to deprive any person or class of persons of their equal civil rights]
are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same,
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act shall be committed, such person or
persons shall be liable to the person injured... for all damages caused by any such wrong.
ful act which such first-named person or persons by reasonable diligence could have pre-
vented; ... and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be
joined as defendants in such action ....
Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. at 15.
106. See, for example, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 751 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger); id. at 756-57 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 761 (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id.
at 824-25 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See generally Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 664-89 (1978) (discussing the legislative history of this provision).
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Edmunds of Vermont, declared that, under this section, every
citizenwho knew of such contemplated outrages
is made a peace officer, and it is made his bounden duty as a citizen of the
United States to render positive and affirmative assistance in protecting the
life and property of his fellow citizens in [the] neighborhood against unlawful
aggression: and if ... he fails to do so, [he is made responsible for it to] his
fellow citizen, who is thus wronged on account of his refusal to help him pro-
tect himself.'0 7
B. The Duty to Prevent Noncriminal Harm
1. The Natural Duty of Individuals
Although early modern natural rights theory was centrally
concerned with the prevention of violence, it also developed a rationale
for a broader duty to rescue, one that extended to other forms of harm.
This rationale emerged from reflection on the problem of necessity:
whether, in extreme distress, it was lawful for one individual to save
his life through the property of another.
The modern debate on necessity began with Hugo Grotius,
generally regarded as one of the founders of the modern natural right
tradition.108 Grotius approached the issue within the framework of his
general theory of property. According to this theory, mankind origi-
nally held all property in common. 0 9 Private ownership arose as a
result of a universal compact, express or implied, in which everyone
agreed that individuals could appropriate things for their own."0 This
agreement, however, would have included an implied condition that
private rights of ownership, being acquired rather than natural, would
give way in a case of dire necessity, in which one person could pre-
serve his own life only through the property of another."' In such
cases, Grotius held, the property at issue reverted to common owner-
ship and legitimately could be taken by the endangered person.12
107. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 820 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See note 62 and
accompanying text (discussing the common-law doctrine that everyone is an officer for the
preservation of the peace).
108. On Grotius, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development
58-81 (Cambridge U., 1979).
109. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Beli ac Pacis Libri Tres bk. 2, ch. 2, § 2 at 186 (Frances W.
Kelsey, trans., Clarendon, 1925) (1646) (Volume 2 of the Classics of International Law edition).
110. Id. at 189-90.
111. Id. § 6 at 193-94.
112. Id.
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Grotius's analysis was subsequently criticized by Samuel
Pufendorf, whose works on the law of nature had a major influence on
the thought of John Locke. 113 In essence, Pufendorf objected that the
Grotian approach to necessity tended to undermine property and civil
society by reverting to the state of nature." 4 Pufendorf held that A's
necessity did not create a right simply to take B's property, but rather
gave rise to a natural duty on B's part to relieve the necessity.11 This
duty was one of humanity rather than one of justice in the strict
sense."6 Anticipating the later distinction between law and morality,
Pufendorf held that duties of justice are perfect duties (with correla-
tive perfect rights), enforceable by coercion in a state of nature and by
the judicial process in civil society." 7 Duties of humanity, by contrast,
are imperfect duties (with corresponding imperfect rights), the per-
formance of which cannot be compelled, thus promoting the virtues of
benevolence and gratitude."8  Pufendorf recognized a crucial
exception, however, in a case of extreme necessity: A should not be
required to perish because of B's refusal to fulfill his duty. In such
cases, Pufendorf held, the duty of humanity becomes a perfect or
quasi-perfect one, the fulfillment of which can be coerced.
Pufendorfs account of necessity reflects his general theory of
natural law. Following Grotius, he held that the law of nature was
based on the concept of sociability. Its fundamental principle was the
preservation of human society." 9 In most cases, Pufendorf treats the
113. For a discussion of Pufendorfs influence on Locke, see Peter Laslett, Introduction, in
Locke, Two Treatises at 75 & n.* (cited in note 68).
114. Pufendorf, Law of Nature bk. 2, ch. 6, § 6 at 303-06 (cited in note 93). In particular,
Pufendorf argued that Grotius's theory of reversion to the common (1) would allow an individual,
if he were strong enough, to take possessions away from an owner who was equally in need, (2)
would not require restitution to the owner when that became possible, and (3) would not permit
an owner to distinguish between an individual who had fallen into distress through his own fault
and one who had not. Id. at 304.
115. Id. § 5 at 302; id. § 6 at 304-05.
116. Id. Pufendorf adopts the Aristotelian distinction between universal justice, which
encompasses the whole of virtue in relation to others, and particular justice, or justice in the
narrow sense, which is fairness with respect to possessions. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
bk. 5, chs. 1-2 (W.D. Ross trans. & J.O. Urmson rev.), in Jonathan Barnes, ed., 2 The Complete
Works of Aristotle 1729, 1781-85 (Princeton U., 1984); Pufendorf, Law of Nature bk. 1, ch. 7, § 8 at
119 (cited in note 93). In these terms, duties of humanity fall within universal justice, while the
obligations to fulfill one's agreements and not to injure others are matters of particular justice.
See id.; id. §§ 14-15 at 127-28.
117. For the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights and obligations, see Pufendorf,
Law of Nature bk. 1, ch. 7, § 7 at 118-19 (cited in note 93). For the identification of justice in the
narrow sense with perfect rights and obligations, see id. § 8 at 119.
118. See id. bk 2, ch. 6, § 5 at 302; id. § 6 at 304-05. On duties of humanity generally, see id.,
bk.3, ch. 3.
119. See Grotius, Prolegomena, in De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres §§ 6, 8, 12, 16 at 11-15
(cited in note 109); id. bk. 1, ch. 3, § 1 at 34; Pufendorf, Law of Nature at ix (cited in note 93); id.,
bk. 2, ch. 3, § 15 at 207-10.
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duty of humanity as an imperfect duty in order to promote the
development of the social virtues of benevolence and gratitude.1 ° To
allow one of society's members to perish, however, would undermine
the very basis of sociability. In such cases, therefore, the duty of
humanity is appropriately treated as a perfect one.
Locke's discussion of necessity in the Two Treatises incorpo-
rates elements from both Grotius and Pufendorf, Like Grotius, Locke
maintains that all property originally belonged to mankind in com-
mon; although individuals have a right to appropriate portions of it as
their private property, these rights are subject to an implicit limita-
tion and must yield to the rights of others in cases of extreme neces-
sity.121 In contrast to Grotius, Locke derives this limitation not from
an original agreement, but rather from the will of God (which he gen-
erally identifies with the law of nature122) that mankind should be
preserved:'2 "God the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his
Children such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this
World, but that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the
Surplusage of his Goods ... when his pressing Wants call for it." 124
Like Pufendorf, however, Locke conceives of necessity as giving
rise to a duty on the part of the property owner toward the distressed
individual. Echoing Pufendorfs contrast between justice and human-
ity, Locke writes: "As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of
his honest Industry... so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much
out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he
has no means to subsist otherwise."125 Thus, in a case of necessity,
charity requires a property owner "to afford [Relief] to the wants of his
Brother," who has a correlative right to such relief, such that "it can-
not justly be denyed him."2 6
To what extent would Locke make the natural duty of charity a
legally enforceable one? Although he does not discuss the distinction
120. For a similar approach to charity from the perspective of virtue ethics, see Linda R.
Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 983 (1990).
Unlike Pufendorf and Locke, Hirshman does not view charity as a duty with correlative rights on
the part of the beneficiaries.
121. Locke, Two Treatises bk. 1, § 42 (cited in note 68). Compare id. bk. 2, § 183
(maintaining that in case of a conflict between two different rights to the same property, the
"Fundamental Law of Nature .... that all, as much as may be, should be preserved," requires that
lhe that hath, and to spare, must... give way to the pressing and preferable Title of those, who
are in danger to perish without it").
122. See, for example, id. bk. 2, § 135 (arguing that civil laws must "be conformable to the
Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration").
123. See id. bk. 1, § 41.
124. Id. § 42.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Id.
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between perfect and imperfect rights and duties, this approach seems
consonant with his position. On one hand, the contrast between jus-
tice and charity suggests that, in general, matters of charity are not
properly subject to coercive enforcement. On the other hand, to allow
another person to perish for want of relief would violate the funda-
mental law of nature that mankind should be preserved. In such
situations, the duty of charity approaches a duty of justice. 127 Insofar
as the duty of charity is a perfect one, it seems that Locke would make
it legally enforceable in civil society, in accord with his general view
that civil law should reflect and give force to the law of nature.128
Thus far, we have been considering necessity as the basis for a
claim with respect to the property of another. It should be observed,
however, that the approach adopted by Pufendorf and Locke, which
transforms the right of necessity into a duty as well, raises the
possibility that this duty is not limited to affording relief through one's
property, but may also extend to one's actions. If the fundamental
law of nature, whether understood in terms of sociability or of
preservation, imposes a duty to save the life of another through one's
property, it would be peculiar if that law did not require saving him
through one's actions as well. Indeed, in an early work, Pufendorf
formulated such a duty to rescue in broad terms:
[O]n the basis of the law of humanity, any one whatsoever is bound, when not
under an equal necessity, to the extent of his power to come to the aid of a
second person placed in extreme necessity, and necessity creates the power of
claiming this aid in very much the same manner as we claim the things to
which we have a right .... For... necessity ... prevails over those reasons
by which, otherwise, we are bidden not to claim by force what is due us by the
law of humanity.129
127. This interpretation helps to explain Locke's statement that in such a case relief may not
"justly" be withheld. Id.
128. Locke observes:
The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society, but only in many Cases are
drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to them, to inforce
their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men,
Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as
well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature .... and
the fundamental Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction
can be good, or valid against it.
Id. bk. 2, § 135 (emphasis in original).
129. Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo bk. 2, obs. 4, ch.
6 at 243 (William Abbott Oldfather, trans., Clarendon, 1964) (1672) (Volume 2 of the Classics of
International Law edition). In the Law of Nature and Nations, Pufendorf does not indicate
-clearly whether the duty of necessity applies to actions as well as property. Some of his remarks,
however, imply that the two are on a par. See, for example, Pufendorf, Law of Nature, bk. 2, ch.
6, § 5 at 301-02 (cited in note 93) (observing that the introduction of private property enabled
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Although Locke does not directly discuss this question, he
suggests that the same doctrine that requires relief through property
governs other cases of necessity as well.130 All of these cases would
seem to fall within the same general principle: the law of nature that
mankind should be preserved.
Even Hobbes, whose conception of human nature and natural
rights is the most individualistic of the early modern natural right
theorists, suggests that there is a natural duty to aid another in dis-
tress. In Hobbes's account, the laws of nature are understood as pre-
cepts of reason with regard to self-preservation.131 The first and fun-
damental natural law is that one should seek to establish peace, and
thereby overcome the destructive war of all against all.132 From this
principle, Hobbes derives a number of other laws of nature, including
the principle "[t]hat every man render himself usefull unto others," by
yielding to them things that are necessary to their preservation and
not required for his own. 133 As an illustration of this duty to be useful
or sociable toward others, Hobbes cites the parable of the Good
Samaritan.134
2. The Responsibility of the State and Its Citizens
a. The State's Duty to Preserve the Lives of Its Members
Early modern natural right theory thus developed a conception
of the natural duty of individuals to preserve the lives of others in
necessity, including economic distress. As with the prevention of
individuals to make "a richer display of humanity and kindness to others, while before that time
they could aid others only by their own personal service'). See also id. at 302 (arguing that a right
of necessity enables a man to take the property of another in a situation in which, inter alia,
'there is no means whereby [another] person may come to the aid of the man who is in want
either of money or assistance7) (emphasis added).
130. See Locke, Two Treatises bk. 1, § 43 (cited in note 68). In this passage, Locke remarks
that if one were allowed to 'work] upon anothers necessity" by withholding relief through one's
property, the same would be true of 'a Man's having his Stores filled in a time of Scarcity, having
Money in his Pocket, being in a Vessel at Sea, being able to Swim, &c .... any of these being
sufficient to enable me to save a Mans Life who would perish if such Assistance were denied him."
Id.
131. Hobbes, De Cive ch. 2, § 1 at 52-53 (cited in note 93); Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 14 at 91
(cited in note 93).
132. Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 14 at 91-92.
133. Hobbes, De Cive ch. 3, § 9 at 66-67 (emphasis in original); Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 15 at
106.
134. Hobbes, De Cive ch. 4, § 7 at 79 (citing Luke 10, 'the Parable of the Samaritan, who had
compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theeves'). The illustration appears in a chapter of
De Cive in which Hobbes seeks to show that his doctrine of natural law is consistent in content
with the divine law set forth in scripture.
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violence, however, this preservation may be achieved most effectively
through collective action. For this reason, the natural right tradition
comes to hold that this responsibility is assumed by the state under
the social contract-that the function of the state is not merely to
prevent violence, but to preserve the lives of its members generally.
Once again, this issue is discussed most often in connection
with the problem of charity. As we have seen, individuals have a
natural duty to alleviate the needs of others. Relying solely on indi-
viduals for this purpose, however, is inadequate, for much the same
reasons that relying on individuals to prevent violence is
inadequate.135 In the absence of public law, there would be no means
of authoritatively determining how much a particular individual is
bound to give or to whom. Private charity is unreliable, providing no
assurance that the basic needs of others will be met. In Hobbes's
words, "as it is Uncharitableness in any man, to neglect the impotent;
so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the
hazard of such uncertain charity."136 Requiring the poor to rely on
private charity renders them improperly dependent on other
individuals. 137 Finally, the alleviation of necessity may exceed the
capability of private individuals, requiring the combined resources of
the community.
As with the prevention of violence, these practical problems
reflect deeper conceptual difficulties.138 As discussed previously, Locke
holds that all human beings naturally constitute a single community
governed by the law of nature.3 9 The natural duty to preserve man-
kind is one that belongs to individuals as members of this community.
In particular, the duty of charity is based on the doctrine that all
property originally belongs to mankind in common and that individu-
als appropriate cbmmon resources subject to the obligation to relieve
the distress of others.' 40 Thus, in fulfilling the duty of charity, an indi-
vidual implicitly acts on behalf of the natural community of mankind,
in the same way as an individual who enforces the law of nature
against violence.' 41 Rights of necessity ultimately should be regarded
as claims against the community and its resources, not against pri-
vate individuals as such. Thus, the problems with relying on private
135. See text accompanying notes 82-86.
136. Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 30 at 239 (cited in note 93).
137. Compare Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 234 (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992) (discussing the inconsistency of personal dependence with republican equality).
138. See text accompanying notes 85.86.
139. See text accompanying note 85.
140. See text accompanying notes 109-12, 121-24.
141. See text accompanying note 86.
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charity are not merely practical, but reflect the underlying point that
charity is ultimately a communal responsibility that should be per-
formed through public institutions.
The tendency of modern natural rights theory is therefore to
transfer the duty of charity from the individual to the community. As
Hobbes puts it, those who by unavoidable accident "become unable, to
maintain themselves by their labour.., ought not to be left to the
Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-
wealth."'' 2 Locke agrees that "common charity teaches, that those
should be most taken care of by the law, who are least capable of tak-
ing care for themselves."43 Similarly, Blackstone writes that both the
natural right to life and "the principles of society" (a phrase that re-
calls Pufendorfs fundamental principle of sociability) dictate that the
poor should be able to "demand a supply sufficient for all the necessi-
ties of life from the more opulent part of the community," by means of
laws enacted for the relief of poverty. 144
Later natural right theorists more fully develop the view that
the state's responsibility is not merely to protect individuals against
violence, but to preserve the lives of its members generally. According
to Kant, such preservation is an obligation incumbent upon the com-
munity by virtue of the social contract:
The general will of the people has united itself into a society that is to
maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the in-
ternal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the soci-
ety who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state the govern-
ment is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of
sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary
natural needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the common-
wealth, since they owe their existence to an act of submitting to its protection
and care, which they need in order to live; on this obligation the state now
bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow
citizens.14
5
142. Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 30 at 239 (cited in note 93).
143. John Locke, Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and
Raising the Value of Money (1691), in 4 The Works of John Locke 1, 11 (London, 12th ed., 1824).
As Richard Ashcraft observes, Locke's draft proposal for reforming the poor law, although harsh
in its treatment of the idle poor, also made clear that everyone must have food, clothing, and
shelter, and made it a crime for any locality to allow a person to perish for want of relief. Richard
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government 273 n.182 (Princeton
U., 1986) (discussing John Locke, Proposed Poor Law Reform (1697), reprinted in H.R. Fox
Bourne, 2 The Life of John Locke 377, 382, 390 (Harper & Bros., 1876)).
144. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *131 (cited in note 48).
145. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals *326 (Mary Gregor, trans., 1991) (1797).
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As we shall see, Hegel extends this view even further, holding that the
state has an obligation to secure not only the lives but also the general
well-being of its members. 1'
b. The Duty of Citizens
i. The Public Duty
In the passage quoted above, Kant develops a structure of
public right and obligation much like the one that I outlined in
connection with the prevention of criminal violence.147 By virtue of the
social contract, the state has an affirmative obligation to preserve the
lives of its members. This obligation includes not only the protection
of life, liberty, and property against violence, but also the provision of
means of sustenance to those unable to provide for themselves. In
return for such preservation, individuals have an affirmative duty to
assist the state in preserving the lives of their fellow citizens by con-
tributing their property to this end.
By generalizing Kant's argument, we can develop a rationale
for a general public duty to rescue. First, although Kant's discussion
focuses on the state's duty to provide sustenance, he indicates that
this duty derives from the state's more general obligation to preserve
the lives of its members. That obligation would extend to preserving
life in an emergency. Second, although this passage seeks to establish
the individual's duty to pay taxes, Kant also recognizes the state's
right to require citizens to perform services. 14 When generalized in
these two respects, Kant's argument would recognize an obligation of
citizens to perform actions necessary to enable the state to fulfill its
duty to preserve the lives of its members.
This reading of Kant yields a general public duty to rescue
parallel to the duty to prevent criminal violence outlined above.149 The
state is bound to preserve the life of an endangered person, such as
one who is drowning. Although the state generally fulfills this duty
through its own officers, on some occasions an officer will not be pre-
sent or will require assistance. In such situations, the state reason-
ably may impose an obligation on every citizen present to assist in
preserving the life of a fellow citizen.
146. See text accompanying notes 272-91.
147. See Part Il.A.1.
148. See Kant, The Metaphy8ics of Moral& at *325 (cited in note 145).
149. See Part HI.A.1.
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ii. The Duty to Individuals
Thus far, this section has treated the general duty to rescue as
a public one, that is, as a duty owed to the state. This duty can be
extended to individuals, however, on the same grounds as the duty of
citizens to assist in preventing criminal violence. Like the latter duty,
the general duty to rescue is one that arises from the social contract.
It is therefore a duty owed above all to the other parties to that con-
tract, and is for their benefit. One who fails to rescue another from
danger commits a wrong not merely against the state, but also
against the individual whom he should have rescued. The appropriate
remedy therefore includes civil liability to the victim, as well as
criminal liability to the state.
C. The Duty to Rescue and the Liberal Tradition
In addition to suggesting a positive rationale for a duty to
rescue-a rationale that will be developed further in the course of this
Article-this exploration of the early natural right tradition provides
the basis for a response to the liberal or libertarian argument against
such a duty.150 According to that argument, the liberal idea of freedom
consists in the right to act as one likes as long as one does not infringe
the rights of others. The appropriate function of law is to safeguard
individual rights, not to require one person to act for the benefit of an-
other. Although there may be a moral duty to be a Good Samaritan,
such duties cannot properly be enforced by law. Accordingly, the
imposition of an affirmative duty to rescue would violate the liberal
values at the core of our legal order. As I have observed, although this
argument has been expressed most forcefully by libertarian writers, it
reflects an understanding of the liberal tradition that is widely
shared.51
This Part has sought to challenge this understanding through
a reading of Locke and other classical liberal writers. According to
Locke, individual liberty is not absolute, but is limited by the law of
nature. The content of that law is not exhausted by the prohibition
against harming others. Instead, natural law also requires individu-
als to preserve mankind by preventing violence. 52 This obligation
relates to matters of justice rather than morality. In addition, indi-
viduals have a natural duty to assist others in need. Although this
150. See text accompanying notes 11-12.
151. See id.
152. See text accompanying notes 74-81.
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obligation is generally one of charity or morality, it becomes a duty of
justice in cases of extreme necessity. 15
For classical liberal thought, then, affirmative obligations do
not necessarily conflict with individual liberty. Indeed, even free and
independent individuals in a state of nature-would have obligations to
aid and protect others, by virtue of their common membership in the
natural community of mankind.154 When individuals enter into civil
society, the political community assumes responsibility for preserving
the lives of its members against violence and other forms of harm. In
return for this preservation, individuals undertake to assist the
community in performing-this function. 55 In this way, the natural
duty to aid and protect others is transformed into a civic one. Once
again, this is not a mere moral obligation, but a fundamental
responsibility of citizenship that can provide the basis for a legal duty.
A similar point can be made in terms of the concepts of nega-
tive and positive liberty, rights, and obligations. It is often said that a
liberal political order is based on the protection of negative liberty
(freedom from interference or coercion) rather than positive liberty
(freedom to, or self-determination), and on the protection of negative
rights (rights against interference by others) rather than positive
rights (rights to receive something from others, for example, govern-
mental benefits).15 As I have argued elsewhere, however, this view
reflects a misunderstanding of the liberal tradition.'15 For Locke and
most other early liberal writers, the idea of liberty had both positive
and negative elements.'8 Thus, natural liberty was understood as the
153. See text accompanying notes 108-30.
154. See text accompanying notes 74-81, 85-86.
155. See text accompanying notes 90-92.
156. On positive and negative liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four
Essays on Liberty 118 (Oxford U., 1969). In a series of opinions, Judge Richard A. Posner has ar-
gued that the Constitution was intended to be "a charter of negative rather than positive
liberties," and that this view precludes finding a constitutional right to governmental services,
including protection against violence. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812
F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), affd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203
(7th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). For a critique of Posner's
"negative liberties" thesis, see Heyman, 41 Duke L. J. 507 (cited in note 22).
157. See generally Steven J. Heyman, Positive and Negative Liberty, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 81
(1992).
158. Hobbes was an exception, defining liberty in a strictly negative manner as "the absence
of... external Impediments to motion." Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 21 at 145 (cited in note 93). As
Hobbes observes, this approach understands liberty in purely physical terms, and 'may be
applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall." Id. Hobbes's ap-
proach thus denies any distinctive value to human freedom. (Indeed, Hobbes takes the position
that the human will is not free, but is determined wholly by a chain of natural necessity. Id. at
146-47.). Accordingly, Hobbes's definition of freedom as the absence of impediments does not
imply that liberty should remain unrestricted. On the contrary, Hobbes holds that unrestrained
liberty leads to the war of all against all, requiring the establishment of an absolute sovereign to
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freedom to act as one wished (the positive element of liberty) without
interference by others (the negative element).1 9 One of the most
fundamental aspects of positive liberty was the power to act for the
preservation of oneself and one's rights. 160 Through the exercise of this
power, individuals establish a community for the protection of their
rights. The individual thereby obtains a positive right to protection by
the community and its members; in return, he undertakes to act for
their protection. In this way, individuals acquire positive obligations
such as the duty to rescue.
In short, there is much in the liberal tradition that provides
powerful support for a duty to rescue. On this view, affirmative
obligations not only are consonant with individual liberty, but
constitute an essential component of a legal order that is intended for
the protection of liberty.161
restrict liberty for the sake of peace and preservation. Liberty in society consists only of the
freedom to do those things that the sovereign has not forbidden. See id. at 148.
159. See, for example, Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *125 (cited in note 48) (defining
natural liberty as "a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any constraint or control, unless by
the law of nature"); Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 4 (cited in note 68) (characterizing the natural
liberty of individuals as the "perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their
Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the WMn of any other Man") (emphasis in original).
This analysis of the classical conception of liberty is consistent with Gerald C. MacCollum's
view that liberty always takes the form of a triadic relation, in which subject X is free from
constraint Y to do action Z. See Gerald C. MacCollum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76
Phil. Rev. 312 (1967), reprinted in David Miller, ed., Liberty 100 (Oxford U., 1991). See also John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 202 & n.4 (Harvard U., 1971) (following MacCollum's account).
160. See Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 128 (cited in note 68).
161. In addition to Locke, affirmative duties also find some basis in other classical liberal
writers to whom contemporary libertarians often look for support. For example, Wilhehn von
Humboldt-one of the first theorists to argue that the state's legitimate concern is solely with the
negative rights and not the positive welfare of its citizens-holds that individuals have an
obligation to aid in the prevention of criminal violence. See Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of
State Action 124 (J.W. Burrow, ed., Liberty Fund, 1993) (1854) (maintaining that, in fulfilling its
duty of protection, the state may "make it legally binding on all the citizens to lend their
assistance to the task, by denouncing not only crimes which are contemplated but not yet
committed, but those which are already perpetrated, and the criminals concerned in them").
John Stuart Mill goes further, recognizing a duty to rescue as well as to contribute to the
common protection and defense. In defining the sphere of action that concerns the interests of
others and is therefore properly subject to legal control, Mill writes:
There are ... many positive acts for the benefit of others, which [an individual] may right-
fully be compelled to perform; such as to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair
share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the
society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual benefi-
cence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless
against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may right-
fully be made responsible to society for not doing.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 12 (David Spitz, ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 1975). See also id. at 70
(observing that although society is not founded on a contract, "every one who receives the
protection of society owes a return for the benefit," including the duty to bear his fair share of "the
labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury or
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IV. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS II: FORMALISM AND LATER NATURAL
RIGHT THEORY
A. The Challenge of Formalism
The early natural right philosophy of Hobbes, Pufendorf, and
Locke seeks to derive the standards of human conduct from nature
itself. The function of natural law is to direct human beings toward
their natural good.162 Although these authors differ in their concep-
tions of this good-defining it variously as the preservation of the
individual, of human society, or of mankind in general-they agree
that it cannot be attained without niutual cooperation. Accordingly,
these writers hold that individuals have a natural duty not only to
refrain from injury, but also to assist one another in need. Thus, in
formulating the obligations of individuals, early natural right theory
does not draw a sharp contrast between negative and affirmative
duties.
Later natural right theory takes an inward turn. For Kant
and Hegel, the basis of right is to be found not in external nature,
which they view as a realm of unfreedom, but rather in the freedom of
the will. On this view, the end of natural right is not the natural good
of human beings but the realization of their freedom.163 In common
molestation"). "A person," Mill adds, "may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his
inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury." Id. at 12.
162. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text (Locke); text accompanying note 131 (Hobbes);
Pufendorf, Law of Nature bk 2, ch. 3, § 15 at 207-08 (cited in note 93) (finding "the basis of natural
law" in what conduct is necessary if man is "to live and enjoy the good things in this world that
attend his condition"). Other early natural right authors take the same position. According to
Blackstone, for example,
[the] precept, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness" ... is the
foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is
branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action
tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance
of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is
destructive of man's happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *41 (cited in note 48).
163. Compare Weinrib, 1 Can. J. L. & Juris. at 16 (cited in note 13) (observing that Kant's
project "required a shift in natural law from its traditional preoccupation with the nature of man
to a new attention to the nature of law" as the realization of freedom). Hegel explains the shift as
follows:
The phrase 'Law of Nature,' or Natural Right, in use for the philosophy of law in-
volves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing ready-formed in
nature, or right as governed by the nature of things.... The former used to be the com-
mon meaning, accompanied by the fiction of a state of nature, in which the law of nature
should hold sway.... The real fact is that the whole law and its every article are based on
free personality alone--on self-determination or autonomy, which is the very contrary of
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with the earlier tradition, Kant and Hegel initially represent this
freedom as the condition of free and independent individuals prior to
the institution of the state. In this setting, natural right merely re-
quires an individual to avoid injuring others, not to advance their
good. This conception of natural right provides the basis of the
Kantian and Hegelian accounts of private law, including the law of
torts. Thus, later natural right theory appears to provide a much
stronger basis for opposition to a duty to rescue than does the earlier
tradition.
In recent years, Ernest Weinrib has developed a formalist
theory of private law that draws in important part on the natural
right thought of Kant and Hegel.164 According to Weinrib, the function
of private law is not to promote the individual or collective good,
whether that good is understood in instrumentalist or noninstrumen-
talist terms. Instead, private law is based on a conception of indi-
viduals as autonomous, self-determining agents, whose freedom in the
external world takes the form of rights to person and property.
Private law is a normative framework for the external interaction of
such individuals, a framework that protects the individual's external
freedom to the extent consistent with the freedom of all. Accordingly,
private law is inherently negative in the obligations it imposes-it
forbids an individual to infringe the rights of others, but does not
require him to act for their benefit.165
Thus, Weinrib contends, to impose an affirmative duty to
rescue would conflict with the very structure of private law. This
argument, it should be observed, focuses solely on private law.
Nothing in Weinrib's view would preclude the adoption of an
affirmative duty to rescue as a matter of public law. Such a duty,
however, could not be recognized or enforced within private law. In
this manner Weinrib constructs a powerful argument against a duty
determination by nature. The law of nature-strictly so called-is for that reason the
predominance of the strong and the reign of force.
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind § 502 (J.N. Findlay, ed., and William Wallace and AN.
Miller, trans., Clarendon, 1971) (Part Three of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences, 3d ed. 1830, with additions first published in 1845) (emphasis in original).
164. See the sources cited in notes 13 and 14. Weinrib explores the Kantian and Hegelian
bases of this position in Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283 (cited in note 13), and Weinrib, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 472 (cited in note 13). See also Weinrib, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 421-24 (cited in note
14).
165. For a similar view, see Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to
Distributive Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 571-73 (1992); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the
Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract
Theory, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077, 1171-72 & n.133, 1173 n.134 (1989).
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to rescue in private law based on his interpretation of the natural
right theories of Kant and Hegel.
In this Part, I explore the later natural right tradition and its
implications for a duty to rescue through a reading of Hegel's The
Philosophy of Right. I shall focus on Hegel's work for two reasons.
First, Weinrib relies on the first part of The Philosophy of Right as the
"purest and most uncompromising" account of the negative character
of private law.166 If, on the contrary, one can show that Hegel's
philosophy provides strong support for an affirmative duty to
rescue-a duty that applies in both public and private law-it will do
much to undermine the formalist position.167  Second, and more
generally, The Philosophy of Right is one of the richest and most
powerful works in the natural right tradition. In many respects, it
articulates the fundamental conceptions implicit in previous natural
right thought, and develops them more fully than any other work. 168
In particular, as I shall argue, Hegel's account supports and deepens
the argument for a duty to rescue developed in Part III of this Article.
166. Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1286 (cited in note 13). See also id. at 1308 (asserting
that "Hegel's account of abstract right is the most sustained attempt in Western legal philosophy
to capture the distinctive rationality of private law').
167. As I have noted, Weinrib's argument against affirmative duties in private law also relies
strongly on his reading of Kant's legal philosophy. See, for example, Weinrib, 87 Colum. L. Rev.
at 489 (cited in note 13). I shall not explore Kant's views in depth in this Article. But compare
text accompanying notes 145-49 (developing a Kantian argument for a public-law duty to rescue).
Weinrib himself tends to treat the Kantian and Hegelian accounts of private law as essentially the
same. See Weinrib, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 421-24 (cited in note 14). In any event, to the extent that
the Kantian account supports Weinrib's formalism, I believe that that account is vulnerable to
Hegel's powerful critique of formalism, which is developed in the remainder of this Part.
168. For some valuable works on Hegel's political and ethical philosophy, see generally
Shomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge U., 1972); Fred R. Dalimayr,
G.WF. Hegel- Modernity and Politics (Sage, 1993); Z.A. Pelczynski, ed., Hegel's Political
Philosophy (Cambridge U., 1971); Z.A. Pelczynski, The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's
Political Philosophy (Cambridge U., 1984); Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism (U. of
Chicago, 1989); Peter Steinberger, Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Yale U., 1988);
Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge U., 1979); Charles Taylor, Hegel
(Cambridge U., 1975); Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge U., 1990).
For a broad range of perspectives on Hegel and legal theory, see generally Hegel and Legal
Theory Symposium, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 847 (1989), reprinted in part in Drucilla Cornell, Michel
Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, eds., Hegel and Legal Theory (Routledge, 1991); Benson, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 515 (cited in note 165); Peter Benson, The Priority of Abstract Right, Constructivism,
and the Possibility of Collective Rights in Hegel's Legal Philosophy, 4 Can. J. L. & Juris. 257
(1991); Edgar Bodenheimer, Hegel's Politico-Legal Philosophy: A Reevaluation, 35 Am. J. Juris.
217 (1990); Drucilla Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the
Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1135 (1988); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982).
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B. Hegel's Philosophy of Right
Like some earlier authors, Hegel finds the basis of right in the
freedom of the will.169 More precisely, he defines right as any exis-
tence that embodies the free will.170 Property is a right, for example,
because it is one of the ways in which the free will embodies itself in
the external world.171
In contrast to earlier writers, however, Hegel holds that the
will is not fixed and static, but is formed (or rather forms itself)
through a process of development.17 2 Because right is an embodiment
of the free will, it follows a parallel course of development.17s The
Philosophy of Right thus consists of a double movement: at the same
time that it traces the development of the free will, or what today
might be called the self, 174 it also traces the development of the concept
of right.
Hegel presents this double movement as occurring in three
stages. The individual begins as an independent person who embodies
his freedom in the external world. At this stage, right takes the form
of property, together with the other basic elements of civil law such as
contract and wrong. External things, however, are inadequate as an
embodiment of freedom. In the second stage, therefore, the self turns
inward, and recognizes that the only true basis of freedom is the will
itself. This is the stage of morality, in which freedom takes the form
of inner reflection and self-realization. As long as the individual's life
is purely inward, however, it cannot fully achieve the good. This
result is attained in the third stage, community, in which the individ-
ual realizes his freedom through relationship with others. In this
stage, right consists of the rights and obligations inherent in belong-
ing to a community, beginning with the family and culminating in the
state.
169. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right § 4 (Allen W. Wood, ed., and H.B.
Nisbet, trans., Cambridge U., 1991) (1821). For some earlier expressions of this view, see
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *125 (cited in note 48) (viewing natural liberty as rooted in "the
faculty of free.will"); Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals at *230 (cited in note 145) (defining right as
'the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another
in accordance with a universal law of freedom").
170. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 29 (cited in note 169).
171. See text accompanying note 184.
172. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 10R, 10A (cited in note 169).
173. See id. § 2 (explaining that the method of the science of right is to "observe the proper
immanent development of the thing [that is, the concept of right] itself').
174. The will may be identified with the self regarded as a normative agent. In the following
discussion, the two terms are used interchangeably.
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The structure of The Philosophy of Right reflects this three-
stage development. Part I of the work is concerned with the realm of
law, which Hegel refers to as abstract right; Part II, with the sphere of
morality; and Part III, with that of community, which Hegel calls
ethical life.17 Thus, in reading The Philosophy of Right, we are also
exploring one of the fundamental problems of modern legal thought:
the relationship between law, morality, and community. Hegel's
contribution to the debate over rescue is best understood in this con-
text.
1. Right
Just as Locke began with the freedom of individuals in a state
of nature, so Hegel begins with what he calls the immediate freedom
of personality.76 A person is a human being who is directly and in-
wardly conscious of his own inherent freedom and individuality. 177
According to Hegel, the freedom of personality is abstract in
two respects. First, an individual becomes conscious of his freedom by
abstracting from all of the particular characteristics that define and
limit him, thereby achieving an awareness of the free and infinite self
within.178 Second, however, this inner self is wholly empty and lacking
in content (other than its own self-awareness). It has achieved its
freedom only at the cost of excluding from itself all of the qualities
that distinguish it from other selves. Ts The abstractly free self has not
yet developed into a concrete individual with a distinctive identity of
its own. Nor has it developed the social aspect of its nature through
entering into relationships with others. Thus the freedom of personal-
ity is abstract in comparison with that of the fully developed selps-a
self that will develop over the whole course of The Philosophy of Right.
For every form of freedom, there is a corresponding form of
right, because (as we have seen) right is an embodiment of the free
will.,", How does the person give objective reality to his freedom?
175. On the meaning of"ethical life," see note 243.
176. See generally Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 34-40 (cited in note 169).
177. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 488 (cited in note 163); Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 35
(cited in note 169). Hegel's use of the terms 'person' and "personality" combines (1) the jurispru-
dential sense of a legal or juridical person, one who is the subject of legal rights and duties, and
(2) the philosophical sense of a rational being. See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary 229-32
(Blackwell, 1992).
178. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 35 (cited in note 169). Compare id. § 5.
179. See Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 488 (cited in note 163); Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§
35, 37 (cited in note 169).
180. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 38 (cited in note 169).
181. See text accompanying note 170.
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Because that freedom is abstract and contentless, the will at this
stage cannot generate its own content; hence that content can come
only from outside. Accordingly, to give existence to his freedom, the
individual must embody his will in the external world. 12 He starts by
asserting exclusive control over his own body, the external side of
himself.' 3 Next, he embodies his will in particular external things,
which become his property.' 84 Through contract, a person acquires a
right to property held by others;85 more fundamentally, he attains
recognition of his own status as a person and an owner of property. 1'
Finally, the individual is entitled to defend and vindicate his rights of
person and property when they are wrongfully infringed by others. 87
In this way, the concept of right initially develops into a system of
private right that includes the basic principles of property, contract,
tort, and crime. This is the system of abstract right, which corre-
sponds to the abstract freedom of personality.
According to Hegel, abstract right is both formal and negative.
It is formal because its basis is the abstract freedom of personality,
which stands above any particular content.'8 Because it abstracts
from content, formal right excludes all consideration of the particular
characteristics, needs, or welfare of individuals.89 Instead, its sole
concern is to realize the formal freedom of individuals conceived of as
persons and property owners. From this standpoint, particular inter-
ests or needs are irrelevant. To illustrate, if a landlord has a right to
evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent, abstract right would allow him
to exercise this right regardless of how great a particular hardship the
tenant may suffer. 9°
Furthermore, abstract right imposes only negative obligations.
Because it abstracts from the content of the will, formal right imposes
182. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 488 (cited in note 163); Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 39,
41-42 (cited in note 169).
183. Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 43, 47-48 (cited in note 169).
184. Id.§§ 48-71.
185. Id. S§ 72-81.
186. Id. § 71R.
187. Id. 3§ 82-103.
188. Id. §§ 36-37.
189. See id. § 37 (noting that '[i]n formal right ... it is not a question of particular interests,
of my advantage or welfare, and just as little of the particular ground by which my will is
determined, i.e. of my insight and intention); id. § 229A (observing that abstract right 'relates
solely to the protection of what I possess; welfare is something external to right as such");
Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1286-93 (cited in note 13).
190. Compare Restatement § 46 cmt. g & illus. 14 (cited in note 5), which uses this hypo-
thetical to illustrate the rule that an act that would otherwise constitute the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress may be privileged if it constitutes the permissible exercise of a
legal right.
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no requirement to act for the sake of any particular end. Hence no
positive duty exists to perform any particular action. 19' In addition,
formal right abstracts from the moral and social relationships that
could give rise to affirmative duties toward others. 192 In the realm of
abstract right, individuals are viewed as inherently separate persons,
each of whom has his own independent will and gives existence to that
will in the external world. 93 Such persons are essentially external to
and indifferent towards one another.194  Accordingly, abstract right
consists solely of commands to refrain from violating the personality
and rights of others. 195 Within the bounds established by these nega-
tive commands, abstract right permits a person to act or dispose of his
property however he chooses, without considering the interests of
others. 96 The freedom that abstract right protects in this way is that
of the arbitrary will. 97
Weinrib therefore is correct when he contends that an affirma-
tive duty to rescue cannot be justified within the structure of abstract
right 98 as it is presented in the first part of The Philosophy of Right.
Abstract right merely forbids me to invade another's rights to her
person and property. I do not violate this purely negative duty by
refusing to assist her, even when my assistance is necessary to save
her from death or serious harm. In addition, although rescue may be
required by the particular needs of the victim, these needs fall outside
the realm of abstract right, which is concerned only with formal free-
dom.
The very harshness of this position,199 however, should lead us
to question whether it constitutes Hegel's entire teaching regarding
affirmative duties. In fact, this is not Hegel's last word on the subject,
but merely the first stage in a dialectic that will lead from abstract
191. See Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1288-89 (cited in note 13).
192. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 38 (cited in note 169).
193. Id. §§ 34, 40.
194. See id. § 112AK
195. Id. § 38 (stating that the requirements imposed by abstract right are 'limited to the
negative-not to violate personality and what ensues from personality. Hence there are only pro-
hibitions of right, and the positive form of commandments of right is, in its ultimate content,
based on prohibition.") (emphasis in original).
196. Id. (observing that, from a positive perspective, abstract right constitutes 'a permission
or warrant" to act as one chooses, within the bounds established by the rights of others) (emphasis
in original); id. § 112A.
197. See G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline § 409 (Ernst
Behler, ed., and Steven A. Taubeneck, trans., Continuum, 1990) (lst ed. 1817). See also Hegel,
Philosophy of Right §§ 46, 75, 81 (cited in note 169) (discussing the role of the arbitrary will in
property, contract, and wrong); id. § 151A.
198. Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1291-93, 1297-98 (cited in note 13).
199. Weinrib himself recognizes the severity of this position. Id. at 1293.
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right through morality to community. This dialectic will provide
powerful support for a duty to rescue.
This dialectic arises because abstract right, according to Hegel,
is abstract in yet another sense: it is inherently one-sided and incom-
plete. In abstract right, the free will gives itself existence in the ex-
ternal world. External things, however, are inadequate as an em-
bodiment of freedom, whose true basis is the will itself.200 Thus, ab-
stract right is defective because it is merely external. In addition,
abstract right lacks independent reality; it is incapable of subsisting
on its own. This point emerges from Hegel's discussion of crime. 20 '
Crime is the negation of right. To re-establish the reality of right,
crime itself must be negated.20 2 In the state of nature, this negation
takes the form of vengeance by the injured party against the criminal.
From the perspective of the criminal, however, this vengeance appears
to be a new infringement, leading to an indefinite cycle of violence.203
This paradox cannot be resolved without the development of an
impartial will that would enable one individual to judge fairly
between the adversaries.20 4
In this way, it becomes clear that abstract right is dependent
for its reality on the subjective will. It can be destroyed by the crimi-
nal will, and can be established securely only through the activity of a
will committed to upholding right for its own sake.20 5 The will thus
comes to recognize itself as the true basis of freedom and right. For
Hegel, this recognition constitutes the transition from the sphere of
abstract right to that of morality.2°6
2. Morality
Whereas abstract right focused on the objectification of free-
dom in the external world, morality focuses on freedom as the inner
subjectivity of the will.2 °7 In the realm of morality, freedom finds its
200. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 106, 107A (cited in note 169).
201. See id. §§ 90-103.
202. See id. §§ 82, 92-93.
203. See id. § 102.
204. See id. § 103. The same problem-the lack of an impartial will to adjudicate controver-
sies-exists with respect to lesser forms of wrong as well. See id. §§ 86, 89.
205. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 502 (cited in note 163).
206. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 104 (cited in note 169).
207. It is important to note that what Hegel calls "morality" is broader than what ordinarily
is meant by that term, that is, the morality of obligation. Instead, Hegel uses the term 'morality"
to refer to the whole realm of subjective volition and the rights and duties (as well as wrongs) that
derive from it, including morality in the narrower sense. See Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 503
(cited in note 163); Hegel, Philosophy ofRight § 108R (cited in note 169).
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existence not in external things, but in the self-determining activity of
the will itself.2°8 Right in this sphere therefore takes the form of what
Hegel calls the right of the subjective will.2°9 To translate Hegel's
language into more familiar terms, the transition from abstract right
to morality represents a movement from rights of property to rights of
personality. 21°
Abstract right was founded on a conception of the individual as
a juridical person, a formal status that abstracted from all particular
characteristics. In morality, by contrast, the individual is conceived of
as a "subject'-a human being who is aware of himself as a distinctive
individual with his own particular identity, traits, and needs.211
Just as personality objectified itself in external things, the
subjective will expresses itself through its actions.21 2 Action involves
the transformation of external reality in conformity with the subject's
own purpose or end.213 Initially, this end is given by the subject's par-
ticular needs, inclinations, and desires, the fulfillment of which consti-
tutes his welfare or happiness.2 14 The subject's right to act thus in-
cludes the right to pursue his own welfare.215 Through reflection, the
subject further recognizes that other subjects have the same ends that
he has; thus the welfare of others is also an essential end of moral
action.2 6  Although welfare was irrelevant within the context of
abstract right, it is central to the sphere of morality.
The respective demands of welfare and right, however, may
conflict with one another. In approaching a conflict of this sort, moral
theories generally assert the priority of one value over the other, or
attempt to reconcile them by determining the appropriate domain of
each. In contemporary philosophy, for example, deontological theories
assert the priority of the right over the good, while utilitarian theories
hold that the primary norm is the maximization of welfare.217 Hegel
208. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 106 (cited in note 169).
209. See id. § 107.
210. A similar development is portrayed in Warren and Brandeis's classic article on the right
to privacy, which represents the common law as gradually moving from the protection of physical
rights to a greater concern with rights of personality, such as reputation and privacy. See Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). (This use of
the term "personality" to refer to the internal, subjective side of human beings of course differs
from Hegel's use of the term. See text accompanying notes 176-80.).
211. Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 105, 107A, 121 (cited in note 169).
212. See id. § 113. See also Dallmayr, Modernity and Politics at 112 (cited in note 168).
213. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 109-14 (cited in note 169).
214. Id. § 123.
215. Id. §§ 121, 123A, 124R.
216. Id. § 125.
217. See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justice §§ 5-6 (cited in note 159) (contrasting
classical utilitarianism with the contractarian theory of justice as fairness).
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takes a different approach: he views such a conflict as a dialectic
between two opposing conceptions. In the course of this dialectic, each
conception is revealed to be essential, but at the same time abstract
and one-sided, expressing only part of the truth. The outcome of the
dialectic is a richer, higher-order concept that unifies the two values
and thus comes closer to the full truth.218
Hegel approaches the conflict between right and welfare from
this dialectical perspective. On one hand, right appears to be prior to
welfare. An intention to promote my own welfare (or even that of
others) cannot justify an action that is wrong.2 19 On the other hand,
welfare must not be wholly sacrificed to right. To take the most ex-
treme case, the preservation of my life is a precondition for my having
any rights at all. If I were prohibited from infringing the rights of
others to save my own life, I "would be destined to forfeit all [my]
rights; and . . . [my] entire freedom would be negated."2 0 For this
reason, Hegel holds, an individual in extreme danger has a right to
save his own life by violating the property rights of another.22 1
Abstract right, as originally presented, did not recognize a
right of necessity. It focused solely on the formal right of the property
owner and was indifferent to the particular needs of others..222 In cases
of necessity, however, Hegel holds that this position is overridden by
that of morality, which represents a higher conception of freedom, in
contrast to which right is merely formal.22
It is true that, at this point, we have merely established a
moral right of necessity, rather than a legal right. Necessity will be
established as a legal right, however, when we reach the third and
final part of The Philosophy of Right, ethical life, which is the sphere
in which positive law comes into existence.2 24 As the unity of right and
218. For Hegel's account of dialectical method, see G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Logic §§ 79-82 (J.N.
Findlay, ed., and William Wallace, trans., Clarendon, 1975) (Part One of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences, 3d ed. 1830) ("Encyclopaedia Logic'); G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of
Logic 53-59, 431-43, 830-38 (AN. Miller, trans., Allen and Unwin, 1969) (2d ed. 1832). For some
studies of that method, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic (P. Christopher Smith, trans.,
Yale U., 1976); Michael Forster, Hegel's Dialectical Method, in Frederick C. Beiser, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Hegel 130 (Cambridge U., 1993).
219. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 126 (cited in note 169).
220. Id. § 127KL
221. Id.§ 127.
222. See text accompanying notes 188-98.
223. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 30, 106 (cited in note 169).
224. See text accompanying notes 277-81. Hegel clearly considers the right of necessity to be
a legal and not merely a moral right. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 127R (cited in note 169)
(observing that the right of necessity provides a basis for the 'benefit of competence," a civil-law
doctrine that allowed a debtor to retain as much of his resources as necessary to support himself);
id. § 132R at 160 (treating the right of necessity as relevant to criminal responsibility).
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morality, ethical life integrates the two in a way that gives priority to
morality, the higher sphere, in cases in which it directly collides with
abstract right.225 Thus, the formalist account of abstract right must be
modified significantly to accommodate Hegel's recognition of a right of
necessity. That account will be modified further in the remainder of
morality and ethical life, in which this right will be transformed into a
duty on the part of others to relieve that necessity.
The dialectic of right and welfare reveals the abstract and
limited character of both.226 Welfare without right lacks justification;
right without welfare is empty. The ultimate outcome of this dialectic
is what Hegel calls the good, which he conceives of as the unity of
right and welfare.27 From this higher standpoint, welfare is not a
good without right, and right is not the good without welfare.22 In
contrast to right, which is a merely abstract and formal universal, the
good is "the fulfilled universal," or "realized freedom."2 29
With the good we come to morality proper, or the morality of
duty. The good is a universal that encompasses not only my own right
and welfare, but also the right and welfare of all others; it therefore
constitutes the ultimate end of the will.2o For this reason, the relation
between the individual will and the good is one of obligation.2 1 An
individual has a moral duty to promote the good, including the good of
others.2 32 In particular, morality requires one to help others in need.233
Hegel underscores the resulting contrast between abstract
right and morality.234 Abstract right viewed individuals from the
outside, as juridical persons who embodied their freedom externally in
their persons and property. From this perspective, individuals were
external to and indifferent towards one another; abstract right there-
fore consisted of negative commands to refrain from violating the
rights of others.235 Morality, on the other hand, represents "the will's
inner attitude towards itself."236 Following Kant, Hegel holds that the
moral will is inherently universal.27 Insofar as the wills of individuals
225. See, for example, id. § 30R.
226. Id. § 128.
227. ia. §§ 128-30.
228. Id. § 130.
229. Id. §§ 128, 129 (emphasis in original).
230. Id. §§ 129-30.
231. Id. §§ 113, 131, 133.
232. Id. § 134.
233. Id. §§ 207, 242.
234. See id. § 112A.
235. See text accompanying notes 191-97.
236. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 112A (cited in note 169).
237. See id. §§ 111, 133-35.
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participate in this universal will, an inner unity exists among them.
In morality, therefore, in contrast to abstract right, the will of the
individual has a positive relation to the will of others-a relation that
gives rise to positive, not merely negative, obligations. 2 8
Hegel's account of morality might appear to provide a rationale
for imposing an affirmative duty to rescue. This rationale is not yet
an adequate one, however, because it overlooks the distinction be-
tween law and morality. Morality is rooted in the inner subjectivity of
the individual. This subjectivity is inviolable and may not be coerced
by law or otherwise.2 9 In addition, the moral duty to aid others is too
indefinite for legal enforcement.240 Although morality enjoins one to
promote the well-being of others in general, it does not specify to
whom this duty is owed or how much must be done to satisfy the duty.
Therefore, insofar as the obligation to aid others is a moral one, it may
not be enforced by positive law.
These difficulties illustrate what Hegel regards as the funda-
mental limitation of morality: its abstract nature. Just as abstract
right was only external, morality is merely internal.241 It constitutes
the perspective of the subjective will, which has not yet translated
itself into reality. For this reason, Hegel holds, morality always re-
mains at the level of an obligation or "ought," which has not yet
achieved fulfillment in the real world. -42
3. Community
The movement from abstract right through morality culmi-
nates in ethical life or community.243 In this sphere, the subjective will
238. See id. §§ 112, 112A. Hegel states:
In connection with formal right, we noted that it contained only prohibitions, and that an
action strictly in keeping with right consequently had a purely negative determination in
respect of the will of others. In morality, on the other hand, the determination of my will
with reference to the will of others is positive-that is, the [universal will] is inwardly
present in what the subjective will realizes.... In the context of right, any intentions
which the will of others may have with reference to my will, which gives itself existence in
property, are irrelevant. In the moral sphere, however, the welfare of others is also in-
volved, and it is only at this point that this positive reference can come into play.
Id.§ 112A.
239. See id. §§ 94A, 106A, 213.
240. See id. § 69R at 100 (indicating that matters that 'cannot be precisely determined
cannot be "defined in terms of right and the law").
241. See id. §§ 33A, 141A.
242. See id. §§ 33A, 108, 141; G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit §§ 596-630 (A.V. Miller,
trans., Clarendon, 1977) (1807).
243. Hegel distinguishes between Moralitdlt, which he equates with Kantian morality, and
Sittlichkeit, a term usually translated as "ethical life." See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 33 (cited
in note 169). Sittlichkeit is derived from Sitte (custom) and refers to "the ethical norms embodied
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recognizes that the good does not lie outside or beyond it, but instead
is realized through the subjective will itself in its relationships with
others.
According to Hegel, ethical life represents the concrete unity or
synthesis of abstract right and morality, each of which is merely ab-
stract when taken on its own. 2" Ethical life retains the unity among
individuals that was central to morality.245 In ethical life, however,
this unity is not merely inward and abstract, as it was in morality,
but is realized in the external world in the form of concrete relation-
ships of community.2"
The structure of these ethical relationships reflects the unity of
morality and abstract right. Inwardly, they are constituted by the
subjective disposition of their members toward one another;247 out-
wardly, they have objective form as relationships of right.2" The
family provides a paradigm example. Its inner content is the subjec-
tive feeling of love that binds its members together; at the same time,
it is an institution defined by the legal relationship among its mem-
bers.249
In ethical life, as in morality, individuals have a positive rela-
tion to one another, giving rise to positive duties. In contrast to mo-
rality, however, ethical duties are not abstract and indeterminate, but
instead are concrete obligations owed to particular individuals. These
obligations reflect the two-fold nature of ethical life. Insofar as they
relate to the inward, subjective dimension of ethical relationships,
ethical duties are, like the duties of morality, beyond the scope of legal
compulsion. 25 On the other hand, insofar as they relate to external
in the customs and institutions of one's society.' Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary at 92 (cited in note
177). Hegel's use of Sittlichkeit is intended to be parallel to the Greek ithika (ethics), which bears
a similar relation to ethos, the custom or way of life of a people.
244. See Hegel, Encyclopedia § 401 (cited in note 197); Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 33, 33A,
141R, 141A (cited in note 169).
245. See text accompanying notes 236-38.
246. See, for example, Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 158, 258 (cited in note 169) (discussing
the unity of the family and of the state).
247. See, for example, id. §§ 158, 268.
248. See id. § 144 (discussing the objective aspect of ethical life). As Hegel expresses it, *the
ethical is a subjective disposition, but of that right which has being in itself. Id. § 141R (emphasis
in original).
249. Id. § 158-59.
250. Id. §§ 159A, 213. A good contemporary illustration of such improper state regulation is
provided by those laws that have been held unconstitutional as invading the privacy of family
relationships. See, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a law that
forbade the marital use of contraceptives unconstitutional). Because they seek to coerce
communication between spouses, laws that mandate spousal notification as a prerequisite for an
abortion may be criticized on the same ground. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992) (holding that these laws impose an undue burden on the right to abortion).
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things, ethical obligations can be the subject of legal duties enforce-
able within the system of abstract right.251 In short, ethical relation-
ships and duties come within the legal realm, "but only in so far as
[they] contain the aspect of abstract right."252
As we have seen, however, abstract right imposes only nega-
tive obligations.25 How, then, is it possible for a positive ethical duty
to be enforceable within abstract right? According to Hegel, an ethical
duty on the part of A to provide an external thing (a good or service) to
B creates a right in the latter akin to a right of property. When A
breaches this duty, he in effect withholds property that is owed to B,
thereby violating the fundamental command of abstract right not to
infringe the right of another.25 When a violation of this command
results in damage to another, it gives rise to a right to civil
compensation. 55
Once more, these points are well-illustrated by the family
relationship, and in particular by the obligation of parents toward
their children. Insofar as this obligation relates to the love that par-
ents should feel for their children, it is inward and subjective, and
therefore beyond the reach of external legal control.25 On the other
hand, insofar as the obligation relates to the material support that
parents must provide, it gives rise to a corresponding right in the
children to receive such support.2 57 If the parents fail to fulfill this
obligation, they deprive the children of something to which they are
entitled, and thus infringe their rights.2 M
It might seem that Hegel's analysis of the enforceability of
positive duties is needlessly complex, and that it would be more
straightforward simply to hold that positive duties are enforceable in
their own right, without first transforming them into breaches of
251. Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 159A, 213 (cited in note 169).
252. Id. § 213. See also id. § 213A.
In the higher relationships of marriage, love, religion, and the state, only those aspects
which are by nature capable of having an external dimension can become the object of
legislation. Nevertheless, the legislation of different peoples varies greatly in this respect.
... In older legislations, there are ... numerous rules concerning loyalty and honesty
which are out of keeping with the nature of law, because they apply entirely to the realm
of inwardness.
253. See text accompanying notes 191-97.
254. See Hegel, Philosophy ofRight § 93R (cited in note 169). Hegel analyzes contract in the
same terms. Through contract, an item that belonged to one individual becomes the property of
another. If the seller fails to perform his part of the contract, he violates the negative commanud-
ment of abstract right by withholding something that is due another. See id. §§ 79, 93R.
255. See id. § 98.
256. See id. §§ 159A, 213A.
257. See id. §§ 159, 174.
258. See id. § 93R.
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negative obligations of abstract right. Arguably, however, Hegel's
approach accurately captures the nature of the juridical phenomenon
under consideration. The positive nature of ethical duties and rights
reflects the positive relationship between individuals in ethical life.
Legal right, however, exists between individuals conceived of as ex-
ternal to and independent of one another, and ultimately involves the
possibility of legal coercion. To conceive of individuals in this way is to
view them from the perspective of abstract right (a perspective that is
contained as an element within ethical life itself, viewed as the unity
of abstract right and morality). Thus, to understand how ethical
duties can be legally enforceable, we must view them as giving rise to
individual rights that are enforceable within the system of abstract
right.
This understanding of the character of ethical relationships
and duties provides the key to developing a Hegelian account of the
duty to rescue. As the next section shows, Hegel holds that an ethical
relationship exists between the citizen and the state. Inherent in this
relationship is the state's obligation to protect the citizen not only
against criminal violence, but also against other contingencies that
might threaten his life or well-being. At the same time, the citizen
has a reciprocal obligation to assist the state in affording this protec-
tion. This obligation provides the basis for a public duty to rescue,
that is, a duty owed to the state. If an ethical relationship exists
between the citizen and the state, however, such a relationship also
exists between the citizens themselves. Thus, as the succeeding
section will argue, potential rescuers and victims participate in a rela-
tionship of community that gives rise to a duty to rescue that is owed
directly by the rescuer to the victim, and that is directly enforceable as
a matter of abstract right.
a. The Relationship Between Citizen and State
According to Hegel, the family is a natural ethical community
based on an immediate feeling of love and unity among its members.w
This unity is a limited and transitory one, however, because children
grow up and leave the family, forming new families of their own.260 In
this way, the family dissolves into what Hegel calls civil society, a
realm in which individuals (and family units) relate to one another as
self-sufficient persons. 261 This is the realm in which abstract right
259. Id. § 158.
260. Id. § 177.
261. Seeid. §§ 157, 181.
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attains its real existence, as a system of property, contract, and
enforcement rights among these independent individuals.2 62
In civil society, the unity of ethical life appears lost in the
unlimited pursuit of private particular interest.263 This appearance is
misleading, however, for in pursuing their own self-interest, individu-
als often are unknowingly contributing to the common good. Through
a process of education, individuals gradually come to recognize the
universal good that underlies their particular interests.2 64 The culmi-
nation of this process is the recognition that one is a member of the
state. The state restores the unity of the family, but on a higher level.
Whereas the family is based on feeling, the state is based on reason,
on a rational consciousness that the state is a community that embod-
ies the good of all.265
The state has the same two-fold structure as the family.266
Outwardly, it is constituted by laws and institutions,'26 7 while its inner
content consists in the disposition of citizens toward one another and
the community. This disposition is one of trust: mutual trust between
citizens, and the individual's trust that his ends find fulfillment in the
community.2 8 Hegel summarizes the ethical relationship between the
citizen and the state, with its corresponding rights and obligations, as
follows:
The individual... finds that, in fulfilling his duties as a citizen, he gains pro-
tection for his person and property, consideration for his particular welfare,
satisfaction of his substantial essence, and the consciousness and self-aware-
ness of being a member of a whole. And through his performance of his du-
262. Id. §§ 209-29.
263. Id. § 181.
264. Id. §§ 187, 209.
265. See id. §§ 158A, 257-58, 260, 268.
266. See text accompanying notes 247-49.
267. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 269-71 (cited in note 169) (describing the political con-
stitution). See also id. § 144 (describing the objective side of ethical life as constituted by "laws
and institutions which have being in and for themselves") (emphasis in original).
268. See id. § 268. Hegel specifically connects the citizen's trust in the state with the latter's
protection of personal security:
[People] trust that the state will continue to exist and that particular interests can be
fulfilled in it alone; but habit blinds us to the basis of our entire existence. It does not oc-
cur to someone who walks the streets in safety at night that this might be otherwise, for
this habit of [living in] safety has become second nature, and we scarcely step to think
that it is solely the effect of particular institutions. Representational thought often
imagines that the state is held together by force; but what holds it together is simply the
basic sense of order which everyone possesses.
Id. § 268A.
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ties as services and tasks undertaken on behalf of the state, the state itself is
preserved and secured.
26 9
Thus Hegel, like Locke, views the relationship between the
citizen and the state as involving reciprocal rights and duties.270
However, while Locke tended to view these rights and duties in
merely instrumental terms, as means to goods like protection and
welfare, Hegel conceives of them as the external dimension of an
inner, ethical relationship in which individuals find the fulfillment of
their essential nature.271
Let us begin with the rights of citizens in relation to the state.
At the outset of The Philosophy of Right, the individual was conceived
of in terms of abstract personality, and right took the form of abstract
right .2 2 In the movement from the sphere of abstract right through
morality to ethical life, however, the individual has developed from an
abstract into a concrete person, whose particular characteristics and
needs are no longer irrelevant but are an integral part of
personality.273 Right has undergone a corresponding transformation,
from the formal freedom of abstract right to the realized freedom of
the good, the unity of right and welfare.2 74 The good is realized in
ethical life, and ultimately in the state, the community in which
individuals fulfill their nature.275 Accordingly, Hegel holds that the
state's obligations toward its citizens include both the protection of
their formal rights and the securing of their particular welfare.27 6
The state protects the rights of individuals through legislation
and adjudication, which together constitute the administration of
justice.2 7 7 In this manner, abstract right is translated into positive
law. At this stage, right becomes actual, and not merely an abstract
"ought."2 78  Because abstract right constitutes what is right in itself,
the law should accord with abstract right.279 Thus the law incorpo-
rates the formal principles of abstract right, including the fundamen-
tal command forbidding infringement of the rights of others. In terms
269. Id. § 261R.
270. See text accompanying notes 90-91.
271. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 258R (cited in note 169) (contrasting the empirical or
instrumental approach of social contract theory with his own view that individuals fulfill their
nature in social life).
272. See text accompanying notes 176-206.
273. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 182 (cited in note 169).
274. See text accompanying notes 227-29.
275. See text accompanying notes 243, 269-71.
276. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 229-30 (cited in note 169).
277. Id. §§ 209-29.
278. See id. §§ 211-14. See also id. § 57R.
279. See id. §§ 312-13.
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of content, however, the rights thus protected derive not only from the
sphere of abstract right itself but also from ethical life, insofar as it
gives rise to external rights.11' In the tradition of natural right juris-
prudence, Hegel emphasizes that the administration of justice is not a
matter of discretion, but rather an obligation on the part of the
state.28'
In addition to protecting the formal rights of citizens, the state
also has a duty to secure their particular welfare. This is the respon-
sibility of what Hegel calls "the police," or what we would call the
welfare state. 282 A principal function of the police is to ensure the
security of persons and property, not only by preventing crime and
bringing perpetrators to justice, but also by protecting against other
kinds of contingencies that threaten harm to citizens. 28 The provision
of basic fire, rescue, and emergency services seems to be an excellent
example of the sort of function Hegel has in mind.28
Hegel further holds that the state has a duty to secure the
livelihood of its citizens. Initially, it was the responsibility of the
family, the natural ethical community, to provide for the needs of its
members.285 The rise of civil society, however, undermines the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of the family, and thus its ability to provide for
those needs. More fundamentally, civil society tends to undermine the
family itself by transforming its members into independent actors who
must pursue their economic well-being in the larger society.28
Individuals thus become dependent for their livelihood upon civil
society, which takes the place of the family with respect to individual
280. See id. § 213. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 313-27.
281. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 219R (maintaining that "[tihe administration ofjustice
should be regarded both as a duty and as a right on the part of the public authority"); id. § 258R n.
t at 280 (condemning the view that the administration of justice is not "a duty on the part of the
state" and "the most perfect means of guaranteeing right"). For a discussion of this obligation in
earlier natural right jurisprudence, see Heyman, 41 Duke L.J. at 519-20 & n.67 (cited in note 22).
282. As Allen W. Wood notes, Hegel follows early nineteenth-century practice in using the
term "police" to refer to 'all the functions of the state which support and regulate the activities of
civil society with a view to the welfare of individuals." Hegel, Philosophy of Right at 450 n.1
(editor's note on "The Police") (cited in note 169). The use of the term 'police power" in American
constitutional law to denote the government's power to promote the public health, safety, and
welfare reflects a similar meaning. The term "police" was not limited to law enforcement until
later in the nineteenth century. Id. See generally Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Police, and the
Pursuit of Happiness in the New American Republic, in 4 Studies in American Political
Development 3 (Yale U., 1990) (tracing the development of the concept of "police" in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century America).
283. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 230-36 (cited in note 169).
284. Compare id. §§ 235, 236A (arguing that the state should provide various services for
public welfare, such as street-lighting, bridge-building, and public health).
285. Id. § 238.
286. Id.
1994] 727
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
needs.28 7 The society thereby assumes a responsibility both to provide
education to enable individuals to earn their own living,2 and to
provide for the needs of those unable to provide for themselves,
because of either their own incapacity or larger economic forces.289
Hegel thus adopts the view nascent in Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone,
and more fully developed by Kant, that the state has an obligation to
ensure the subsistence of its members.290
In sum, Hegel holds that the state has a duty not merely to
protect the formal rights of its members, but also to secure their par-
ticular welfare, by protecting them against criminal violence, preserv-
ing them from other forms of harm, and ensuring that they have
means of subsistence. These services, Hegel emphasizes, are not mere
benefits that the state can bestow or not as it chooses, but rights
inherent in belonging to the community. 291
Like earlier writers, Hegel also holds that citizens owe recipro-
cal duties to the state.292  In particular, the citizen is obligated to
perform services necessary for the common good. 293  This obligation
generally takes the form of a duty to pay taxes.294 The principle of
subjective freedom, which is central to morality and which lies at the
foundation of the modern state, dictates that the state generally
should not commandeer particular services, but should obtain them on
a voluntary basis in exchange for payment.2 95  As Hegel recognizes,
however, there are exceptions to this general rule. 298 The nature of
trial by jury, for example, requires that citizens have a legal
obligation to perform jury service when called.27
Although Hegel does not directly address whether the law
should impose a duty to rescue, a compelling argument for such a duty
can be made on Hegelian grounds. As we have seen, Hegel would hold
287. See id. §§ 238, 239, 241.
288. Id. § 239.
289. Id. §§ 240A, 241-42.
290. See text accompanying notes 142-45.
291. See Hegel, Philosophy of Rikht §§ 229A, 230 (cited in note 169) (arguing that the right
present in particularity, which derives from morality and is realized in the state, requires "that
particular welfare should be treated as a right and duly actualized") (emphasis in original); id. §
238A (explaining that "if a human being is to be a member of civil society, he has rights and claims
in relation to it, just as he had in relation to his family. Civil society must protect its members
and defend their rights, just as the individual owes a duty to the rights of civil society.").
292. See id. § 261R.
293. See id. § 299.
294. Id.
295. See id. §§ 206R, 299R, 299A.
296. See id. § 299R (recognizing that "[s]ervices associated with the defence of the state
against its enemies" are an exception).
297. Compare id. § 228R (advocating the adoption of trial by jury).
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that the state is obligated to prevent harm to one of its members in an
emergency situation. When none of its own officers are present,
however, the state can act only through its citizens. If citizens had no
duty to act in such cases, the state would fail to fulfill its obligation,
thereby undermining its ethical relationship with its citizens. By
virtue of this relationship, citizens have a responsibility to assist the
state in fulfilling its functions, which themselves serve the purpose of
securing the rights and well-being of citizens. For these reasons, the
state may properly impose such a duty on its citizens. Finally,
because this duty relates to outward matters-to external action and
to the preservation of life and other outward interests-it can be made
a legal and not simply a moral duty. 9 8
One of Hegel's unpublished lectures on The Philosophy of Right
provides powerful support for this position.2 99 In this lecture, Hegel
criticizes Fichte for proposing a pervasive police presence in society in
order to prevent crime and promote the common good. According to
Hegel, Fichte would require the police to constantly monitor the
activities of individuals to ensure that they did not commit crimes.
This monitoring not only would lead to an intolerable invasion of
privacy, but also would require additional police to monitor the
activities of the police themselves, and so on, leading to an infinite
regress. The only solution, Hegel argues, is that "the universal should
be essentially not external but an inward, immanent end, the activity
of individuals themselves."300 In other words, the preservation of law
and order ultimately must be a product not of external state force, but
of the activities of the citizens themselves.
Hegel's criticism of Fichte suggests a further response to the
liberal or libertarian opposition to a duty to rescue, which was consid-
ered earlier.31 According to that view, the sole legitimate end of the
state is to secure the rights of individuals. This end requires the
existence of state force to protect individuals against violence and
wrong. To the extent that this force is insufficient to protect against
violence, the state fails in its function. On the other hand, if the state
had sufficient force for this purpose, that force would be so great as to
leave no security against oppression by the state itself. As Hegel
suggests, the only solution to this dilemma is for the force of the com-
298. See text accompanying notes 254-57.
299. G.W.F. Hegel, 4 Vorlesungen aber Rechtsphilosophie 617 (K.-H. flting, ed., Frommann
Verlag, 1974), translated and discussed in Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 234 at 450-51 n.1 (editor's
note) (cited in note 169).
300. Id.
301. See PartIIT.C.
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munity ultimately to be conceived of not as external force but as the
activity of the citizens in preserving their own rights against violence.
For this reason, I would argue, imposing a duty to rescue (at least in
the context of criminal violence) is more consistent with a libertarian
or liberal position than is relying solely on state power to protect
individual rights.
b. The Bond Between Citizens
Thus far, the Hegelian argument for a duty to rescue has fo-
cused on the ethical relationship that exists between the citizen and
the state, and on the reciprocal rights and duties that arise from that
relationship. It therefore might seem that the duty to rescue is a
public one owed to the state alone and not to the potential victim.
This conclusion, however, conceives of the state in an abstract way, as
an external power that stands over and above the citizens. According
to Hegel, when we view the state in a concrete way, we recognize that
it is nothing other than the community of individuals that compose
it.302 The state is an ethical whole constituted by the relationship
among its citizens, in much the same way that the family is consti-
tuted by the relationship among its members. Therefore, the citizen
has an ethical relationship, and corresponding duties, not merely to
the state as a whole, but also to his fellow citizens. When he violates
an obligation imposed by the state for the good of another citizen, such
as a duty to rescue, he commits a wrong not only against the state as
a whole, but also against that individual.
The same point can be expressed in terms of Hegel's view of the
relation between the particular and the universal, which he identifies
in the present context with the individual and the state,
respectively 303 From an abstract perspective, the universal is
separate from and stands above the particular: a sharp distinction
exists between state and individual, public and private. The
individual's duty to the state requires a sacrifice of his own particular
interests in order to submit to the will of the universal. In contrast,
Hegel views the universal not as separate from the particular but asimmanent within it: the state exists only through the individuals that
compose it. From this concrete perspective, fulfilling one's duty
toward the universal does not inherently require a sacrifice of one's
own particular interests; instead, as we have seen, in fulfilling that
302. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 260-61 (cited in note 169).
303. The analysis in this paragraph is derived primarily from id. § 261R.
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duty one attains the protection of one's rights and the satisfaction of
one's material needs. The reason is that the duties that one owes the
state are imposed for the benefit of its members, including oneself.304
For example, when I perform my duty to assist in preventing criminal
violence, I gain protection for my own person and property by
upholding a legal order that affords me that protection. In performing
this duty, however, I obtain protection not only for myself but also for
my fellow citizens in general, and for the potential victim in
particular. Thus, in fulfilling my duty to the state I also fulfill a duty
owed to the victim. In other words, the duty to rescue is not simply a
public duty but a social one, a duty owed to other individuals as well
as to the community as a whole.3
Thus far, this section has presented a Hegelian argument for
the duty to rescue based on the ethical relationship that exists be-
tween citizens. More precisely, however, it may be said that rescue
plays a role in creating this relationship. This point emerges when
one considers rescue in the context of Hegel's distinction between civil
society and the state. As discussed earlier, civil society is the realm in
which self-sufficient individuals pursue their own particular interests,
while the state is a community of citizens who are conscious of being
members of a whole.30
Initially, both the victim, V, and the potential rescuer, R, share
the status of members of civil society who are pursuing their own
particular interests. Once danger arises, however, the law calls on R
to rise above this status and act in the capacity of a member of the
state. When V is rescued in this way, he comes to recognize R not
merely as a member of civil society, but also as a fellow citizen who
makes the good of others, including V, his own. Accordingly, a rela-
tionship of citizenship based on interdependence and mutual trust is
304. See id. § 261A (noting that 'what the state requires as a duty should also in an immedi-
ate sense be the right of individuals, for it is nothing more than the organization of the concept of
freedom').
305. Hegel's logic also helps to explain how tho duty to rescue can be owed directly to both
the state and the victim. From an abstract perspective, if this obligation is owed directly to the
state, it must be owed to the victim only indirectly, and vice versa. This abstract view implies
that the duty to rescue must be essentially either public or private, but not both. For Hegel,
however, in a concrete ethical relationship such as that which exists among state, victim, and
rescuer, each element has a direct and essential relationship with the other two. Thus, it may be
true both (1) that the rescuer has a direct relationship with and a duty to the state, the
performance of which indirectly benefits the victim, and (2) that the rescuer has a direct
relationship with and a duty to the victim, the performance of which indirectly upholds the
universal interests of the state. Compare Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic § 198 (cited in note 218)
(giving a similar account of the relationship between individual, state, and particular needs).
306. See text accompanying notes 263-65.
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formed between R and V.307 The duty to rescue thus may be viewed as
providing a transition from the sphere of civil society to that of the
state.o303
4. Conclusion
Hegel's Philosophy of Right provides powerful support for a
legal duty to rescue. According to Hegel, right initially takes the form
of abstract right. In this sphere, individuals are conceived of as juridi-
cal persons who embody their freedom in the external world in their
persons and property. Abstract right is concerned with the external
interaction of persons conceived of in this way. Its fundamental in-
junction is not to injure others. As the problem of necessity shows,
however, abstract right is indifferent to the well-being or even the
existence of individuals, rendering it inadequate as a conception of
right. In contrast to abstract right, which is external and negative,
morality is internal and positive. It is based on an inner unity among
individuals, a positive relation that gives rise to an obligation to pro-
mote the good of others. Morality, however, is a matter of conscience,
and thus beyond the scope of the law.
For Hegel, both right and morality are abstract when consid-
ered alone; they attain their full realization in ethical life or commu-
nity. Like morality, ethical life involves positive relationships be-
tween individuals. In contrast to morality, however, these relation-
ships are not merely inward but have external existence in the form of
concrete social relationships. As members of these relationships,
individuals have positive duties toward one another. To the extent
that these duties relate to external things, they give rise to corre-
307. Rescue plays a similar role in creating community in the parable of the Good Samaritan.
Luke 10:25-37. Jesus tells the parable in response to the lawyer's question, "[Who is my
neighbor?," Luke 10:29, for purposes of the biblical commandment to love one's neighbor as
oneself. See Leuiticus 19:18. In the parable, a man who has been beaten by robbers is ignored by
a priest and a Levite, but is aided by a Samaritan. Jesus concludes by asking, -Which of these
three, do you think, proved [literally, "became] neighbor to the man who fell among robbers?" to
which the lawyer replies, "The one who showed mercy on him." Luke 10:36-37. As many scholars
have observed, the Samaritan was in no ordinary sense a neighbor to the man beforehand; the
relationship of neighbor was created through his act of mercy. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, ed., The
Anchor Bible: The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV 884 (Doubleday, 1985). For further
discussion of the parable of the Good Samaritan and the Anglo-American law of rescue, see
Steven J. Heyman, The Good Samaritan, in Paul Finkelman, ed., Religion and American Law: An
Encyclopedia (Garland Press, forthcoming 1994).
308. Such transitions play an important role in The Philosophy of Right. As discussed
earlier, for example, crime and avenging justice bring about a similar transition from the sphere
of abstract right to that of morality. See text accompanying notes 201-06.
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sponding rights that are enforceable within the system of abstract
right.
Hegel understands the relationship between citizens and the
state in these terms. The state has a positive duty to protect the rights
and promote the well-being of its members, who in turn have an obli-
gation to act for the preservation of the community and their fellow
citizens. These duties are external ones and thus subject to legal
enforcement. In this way, a duty to rescue can be justified on
Hegelian grounds.
C. Hegel and Formalism
Having explored The Philosophy of Right, we are now in a posi-
tion to respond to Weinrib's formalist argument against a duty to
rescue in tort law, insofar as that argument relies on Hegel. As
Weinrib emphasizes, Hegel understands tort law in terms of abstract
right.309 Abstract right is formal. It regards individuals as juridical
persons with formal rights to property and contract, rather than as
particular individuals with substantive rights to welfare. Moreover,
abstract right imposes only negative obligations. For these reasons,
Weinrib contends that an affirmative duty to rescue cannot be recog-
nized or applied within abstract right, including the law of torts.310 Of
course, Weinrib recognizes that the Hegelian theory of right is not
limited to abstract right but also includes morality and ethical life.31'
He denies, however, that these "later developments in the dialectic of
right" operate to revise Hegel's account of private law as abstract
right.3 12 Accordingly, while nothing in Weinrib's position would ex-
clude the possibility of an affirmative duty to rescue based on the
relationship between citizens and the state, he would insist that this
duty could only be one of public law. Whatever sanctions properly
might be imposed for the breach of this duty, they could not include
liability under private law.
Weinrib's position misconceives both the nature of abstract
right and its relation to ethical life. It is true that, in the first part of
The Philosophy of Right, Hegel presents abstract right as a system of
formal right, whose elements include the rights of property and
contract, together with the right to enforce these rights against
309. Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283 (cited in note 13).
310. Id. at 1291-93, 1297-98.
311. Id. at 1308.
312. Id.
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wrongful infringement.3' 3  When viewed as an integral part of The
Philosophy of Right, however, abstract right does not constitute a
closed system, but interacts with other forms of right. Precisely be-
cause abstract right is merely formal, it is capable of enforcing rights
regardless of the source or content of those rights (as long as they are
external and thus properly subject to coercive enforcement). Thus,
abstract right provides a means -of enforcing all rights-not only those
arising within the system of formal right itself (property and contract),
but also those deriving from ethical life.314  Indeed, abstract right
provides the only means of enforcing these rights, for Hegel treats
coercion as justified only within the context of abstract right.315
Thus, abstract right interacts with the higher sphere of ethical
life. The stage in The Philosophy of Right at which this interaction
occurs is the administration of justice. As we have seen, it is at this
stage that abstract right, or what is right in itself, is translated into
existence as positive law.316 Law retains the formal structure of
abstract right. At the same time, Hegel observes that right
comes into existence in terms of content when it is applied to the material of
civil society-to its relationships and varieties of property and contracts in
their endlessly increasing diversity and complexity-and to ethical relation-
ships based on emotion, love and trust (but only in so far as these contain the
aspect of abstract right ... ). Since morality and moral precepts concern the
will in its most personal subjectivity and particularity, they cannot be the ob-
ject of positive legislation. Further material [for the positive content of right]
is furnished by the rights and duties which emanate from the administration
of justice itself, from the state, etc.3 17
In other words, when what is right in itself is transformed into posi-
tive law, the formal principles of abstract right are "applie'311 not
313. See text accompanying notes 181-87.
314. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 93R (cited in note 169) (explaining that abstract right
is violated by 'failure ... to fulfil rightful duties towards the family or state'); id. § 95R (indicating
that abstract right encompasses crimes against the state as well as individuals).
315. See, for example, id. §§ 93-94 (discussing abstract right and coercion); id. §§ 159, 213,
213A (noting that ethical relationships are subject to law 'only in so far as (they] contain the
aspect of abstract right').
316. See text accompanying note 278.
317. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 213 (brackets inserted by the cited translation) (emphasis
in original).
318. Id. "Application" (Anwendung) is a key term in this context, central to an
understanding of Hegel's conception of the relation between abstract right and ethical life. In
methodological terms, Hegel distinguishes between the dialectical development of concepts, which
he regards as the distinctive method of philosophical science, and the 'application' of such
concepts to particular content, which is characteristic of analytical thought in general and legal
method in particular. See id. §§ 3, 31. Because such applications do not affect the conceptual
structure of the subject (in this case, the Idea of right), Hegel discusses them only in passing. See
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only to the rights of property and contract (as they have been modified
by the complex relations of civil society), but also to the rights and
duties arising from family relationships ("relationships based on emo-
tion, love and trust") and from the relationship between individuals
and the state.
Weinrib therefore is correct when he asserts that positive law
retains the normative structure of abstract right, including its formal
and negative character.319 The basic norm of positive law, like that of
abstract right, is the injunction not to infringe the rights of others. In
the case of positive law, however, the substantive rights to which this
norm applies are not only those of property and contract, but also
those deriving from ethical life. As we have seen, ethical life gives rise
to some positive rights to receive support or assistance from others.320
Accordingly, although legal commands are negative in form, they
operate to enforce some rights and duties that are positive in sub-
stance.321 Indeed, in a passage that is fatal to Weinrib's position,
id. § 270 at 292 n.t. Nevertheless, he indicates that they are indispensable to a 'comprehensively
concrete" understanding of a body of positive law. Id.
In substantive terms, Hegel often uses the term 'application' to describe the relationship
between a lower and a higher sphere. See id. § 282R. For example, Hegel holds that art, religion,
and science are spheres that transcend the state (and right in general). See Hegel, Philosophy of
Mind §§ 553.77 (cited in note 163). Nevertheless, in some respects, art, religion, and science enter
into the sphere of the state-for example, in the ownership of property by art museums, churches,
and scientific institutions. In these respects, "the principles of the state are applicable to them.'
Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 270R at 292 n.t (emphasis in original) (cited in note 169). See also,
for example, id. § 95R (explaining that, although the discussion of crime in the section on abstract
right is limited to offenses against individuals, the same principles also "appl[y]" to subsequent
developments in the idea of crime, including offenses against the state).
As the passage quoted in the text indicates, Hegel views the relation between abstract right
and ethical life in these terms. Although ethical life transcends abstract right, the principles of
abstract right 'apply" to ethical relationships "in so far as [they] contain the aspect of abstract
right." Id. § 213.
319. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Professor Brudner's Crisis, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 549, 551-52
(1990); Weinrib, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1308-09 (cited in note 13).
320. See text accompanying notes 250-52,256-58.
321. Weinrib cites several passages in support of his contention that "the private law of civil
society is identical with the norms of abstract right," and thus necessarily excludes positive rights
that derive from the higher spheres of morality and ethical life. Weinrib, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. at
552 (cited in note 319). See, for example, Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 229 (cited in note 169)
(remarking that the universal present in the law of civil society 'is that of abstract right")
(emphasis in original); Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 530 (cited in note 163) (explaining that
"inasmuch as [positive laws are] laws of strict right, they touch only the abstract will-itself at
bottom external-not the moral or ethical will'). See also Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 212 at 136
(T.M. Knox, trans., 1952) (1821) (asserting that positive law has obligatory force only by virtue of
its conformity to what is right in itself). But compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 212 at 243
(cited in note 169) (translating the same passage in a substantially different way).
As the argument in the text tries to make clear, Weinrib's reliance on these passages is
misplaced. Hegel's remarks indicate that positive law should incorporate both the formal
principles of abstract right and its substantive content, that is, the rights of property and con-
tract. His remarks do not imply, however, that the content of positive law can come only from the
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Hegel expressly states that one can fail to fulfill external duties aris-
ing from ethical life either "by action or by default," and that this
failure constitutes a violation of abstract right.322
This analysis makes clear how, contrary to Weinrib's view, an
affirmative duty to rescue can be recognized and enforced by the sys-
tem of abstract right. As I have suggested, a Hegelian account of the
duty to rescue would focus on the positive ethical relationship between
citizens. By virtue of this relationship, an individual has an obligation
to assist a fellow citizen in danger, and the victim has a corresponding
right to receive that assistance. Although this right arises from ethi-
cal life, it can also be viewed from the perspective of abstract right as
a quasi-property right belonging to the victim as a legal person. R's
breach of this duty violates abstract right by withholding property or
a service owed to another.3 _3 If this violation results in damage to V,
he is entitled to recover compensation from R under tort law. 324 Thus,
although the duty to rescue derives from public law, it is enforceable
in private law.325
Weinrib might object that this account undermines the coher-
ence of private law by importing into it norms from outside that body
of law.326 In one sense, it can be said that this ideal of the coherence of
sphere of abstract right. On the contrary, as we have seen, Hegel expressly states that positive
law also gains its content from "ethical relationships based on emotion, love and trust" as well as
"the rights and duties which emanate from the administration of justice itself, from the state, etc."
Id. § 213.
322. Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 93R (cited in note 169) (emphasis added). See also id. §
294R at 333-34 (indicating that "[tihe wrong which is done by non-performance or positive
infringement [of certain duties owed to the state] (i.e., by an action in violation of one's duty,
which applies in both of these cases)" constitutes an infringement of abstract right).
323. See id. § 93R.
324. See id. § 98.
325. Although I focus here on Weinrib's claim that an affirmative duty to rescue cannot be
applied within tort law, his position further implies that, within Hegel's framework, such a duty
also cannot be enforced through criminal law. For Hegel, tort and criminal law are both
subdivisions of abstract right. If, as Weinrib contends, abstract right can enforce only negative
obligations, then an affirmative duty to rescue would be excluded under criminal as well as tort
law. Of course, this interpretation also would mean that the law could not impose criminal
liability for a failure to pay taxes, to serve in the military, or to perform any other positive
obligation imposed by the state. Hegel clearly does not hold such an extravagant position. See,
for example, id. § 93R (indicating that failure to perform rightful duties toward the state through
"default" violates abstract right); id. § 294R at 333-34 (observing that non-performance of duty by
a civil servant constitutes a crime). Hegel's recognition of the capacity of criminal law to enforce
positive obligations decisively undermines Weinrib's contention that abstract right is incapable of
enforcing such obligations. It thereby also undermines Weinrib's argument against affirmative
duties in tort law, since that argument is based on his interpretation of abstract right in general.
326. According to Weinrib, "[c]oherence is the criterion of truth for the formalist
understanding of a juridical relationship," such as the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant in tort law. Weinrib, 97 Yale L. J. at 972 (cited in note 13). To be coherent, a juridical
relationship must consist of doctrines and institutions that "exemplify a single theme' and
thereby constitute a unitary whole, rather than "an aggregate of conceptually disjunct or
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formal right is precisely what Hegel means to deny in his account of
the application of abstract right to the material of civil society and the
state. In another sense, however, the account that I have advanced
here can be said to preserve the coherence of formal right more fully
than Weinrib's own view. As I have explained, abstract right does not
enforce ethical rights and duties as such, but only insofar as they can
be viewed as quasi-property rights within the System of abstract
right.327 Abstract right enforces all individual rights regardless of
their source or content. From this perspective, the coherence of formal
right would be undermined by refusing to enforce ethical rights and
thereby arbitrarily limiting its scope.
Hegel's account of the relationship between abstract right and
higher forms of right reflects a more general stance toward legal
formalism. As Weinrib emphasizes, The Philosophy of Right begins
with a formalist account of right as abstract right. Although Hegel
gives formalism its due, however, his work also constitutes one of the
most powerful critiques of formalism ever articulated. According to
Hegel, the formalist theory of law is based on an abstract conception
of the self. In its full development, however, the self is not merely a
juridical person but also a moral agent, a family member, a member of
civil society, and a citizen of the state. Similarly, a fully developed
conception of right must encompass not only formal right but also
morality and the rights and obligations that arise from family life,
civil society, and the state.
For Hegel, the realm of formal right cannot be understood
entirely in its own terms, but must be viewed as part of the system of
right as a whole. Formal right interacts with higher forms of right,
and provides the means of enforcing them. In this way, the legal
system comes to enforce positive obligations such as the duty to res-
cue.
inconsistent elements that... happen to be juxtaposed." Id. at 968-69. For example, Weinrib
maintains that the doctrines and institutions of negligence law (such as actual causation, duty,
proximate causation, adjudication, and the award of damages as a remedy) can all be understood
as expressions of a single idea: the bipolar relationship arising from the defendant's wrongful
causation of harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 969. It follows from this conception that 'no liability lies
for failure to prevent or alleviate suffering" that arises independently of the defendant's acts. See
Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 516-17 (cited in note 13). On this view, to recognize or enforce
affirmative duties within negligence law would undermine the coherence of that body of law.
327. See text accompanying notes 253-58.
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V. TOWARD A LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF THE DUTY TO
RESCUE
A. The Liberal-Communitarian Theory and Other Rationales for a
Duty to Rescue
Our exploration of the common-law and natural right tradi-
tions has suggested a justification for a general duty to rescue.
According to this account, the state is a community whose ends in-
clude the protection of its members from criminal violence and other
serious harm. Every citizen has a fundamental right to protection by
the community 3 28 In return, the individual has an obligation to assist
in performing this function by acting when necessary to rescue a
fellow citizen in danger. This duty is owed not only to the community
at large but also to the other members of the community, especially
the endangered person.3 29 An individual who breaches this obligation
328. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the
Supreme Court held that under the Fourteenth Amendment individuals have no right to
protection by the state against private violence. I have argued elsewhere that DeShaney reflects
a misunderstanding of the American constitutional and legal tradition through the end of
Reconstruction. According to that tradition, the most basic obligation of government was to
protect its citizens. See Heyman, 41 Duke L. J. 507 (cited in note 22). Apart from its
misunderstanding of the history and language of the Fourteenth Amendment, DeShaney appears
to be based largely on federalism concerns, that is, on a hesitancy to impose afirmative
obligations on the states as a matter of federal constitutional law. Thus, the decision has little
bearing on whether a state should recognize a duty of protection as a matter of its own
constitutional (or nonconstitutional) law, or should impose on its citizens a reciprocal duty to
assist in providing this protection. For further criticism of DeShaney, see Akhil R. Amar and
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
2271 (1990); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 S. Ct.
Rev. 53; Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the 'Free World" of DeShaney, 57 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1513 (1989).
329. For some other arguments for rescue as an obligation of citizenship, see Glendon, Rights
Talk at 78-89 (cited in note 19); Herbert Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship,
in The Good Samaritan and the Law at 213, 220-21 (cited in note 26). In her Storrs lectures, the
late Judith N. Shldar expressed a similar view in terms of a theory of 'active republican
citizenship':
'Who does not prevent or oppose wrong when he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he de-
serted his country." It is a notion that has special importance for any theory of republican
citizenship, ancient or modern.
Passive injustice is more than failing to be just, it is to fall below personal standards
of citizenship.... The normally unjust man is guilty of falling below law and custom by
actively violating them and also by being unfair. The passively unjust man, however, does
something different; he is simply indifferent to what goes on around him, especially when
he sees fraud and violence. His failure is specifically as a citizen. It is not a matter of
lacking general human goodness.... To prevent fraud and violence when we can do so is
an act of citizenship, not of humanity.
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can properly be held responsible both to the community through its
criminal law and to the injured party in a tort action.330
As I have suggested, this account may be termed a liberal-
communitarian theory of the duty to rescue. It draws substantially on
the modern natural right tradition, which constitutes an important
element of the background of contemporary liberal as well as commu-
nitarian thought. In common with liberalism, the theory emphasizes
the fundamental need to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
individuals. It holds, however, that this protection can be fully
achieved only within a community whose members recognize an obli-
Judith N. Shlar, The Faces of Injustice 40-42 (Yale U., 1990). The quotation in this passage is
taken, with some modification, from Cicero, The Offices bk. 1, ch. 7 at 25 (Walter Miller, trans.,
Harvard U., 1921).
In emphasizing citizenship and community as the ground of a duty to rescue, I do not, of
course, mean to imply that aliens should be excluded from the benefits of this duty. According to
both the common-law and social contract traditions, the state's duty of protection extends not only
to its permanent members, but also to aliens while they are present within the state's jurisdiction.
Conversely, aliens owe a temporary allegiance to the state as long as they enjoy its protection.
See Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 384 (1608); Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, §§ 119-
22 (cited in note 68). In effect, aliens are treated as temporary members of the community for
purposes of protection. Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (remarks of
Senator Cowan during the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment) (remarking that "so far as
the courts and the administration of the laws are concerned, I have supposed that every human
being within their jurisdiction was in one sense of the word a citizen, that is, a person entitled to
protection"). In this Article, I have suggested that the strongest basis for a duty to rescue lies in
the community's duty of protection, and in the obligation of its members to aid in performing this
function. Thus, aliens should enjoy the benefits of the duty to rescue, and, at least in situations in
which they become residents of the community, should be subject to that duty themselves.
330. See text accompanying notes 99-100 (discussing social contract theory), 101-02 (drawing
an analogy to the doctrine of statutory negligence), 302-05 (developing a Hegelian account of the
ethical relationship between citizens). Some proponents of a duty to rescue rooted in public-law
concepts would restrict that duty to criminal law. Anthony D'Amato, for example, takes the
position that individuals owe no 'personal duty" to strangers, but have an obligation as 'members
of society.., to act responsibly" by rescuing fellow citizens in danger. For this reason, he argues
that failure to rescue should give rise to criminal but not tort liability. Anthony D'Amato, The
"Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 798, 804-09 (1975). Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon,
drawing on the approach of many European legal systems, is inclined to view the problem of
rescue 'as one involving civic duties rather than private rights," with criminal rather than tort
sanctions as the appropriate solution. Glendon, Rights Talk at 84-85 (cited in note 19).
As I have sought to show, however, the ideas of civic duty and private right need not be
understood as mutually inconsistent approaches to the problem of rescue. A community is
constituted not only by the bond between citizen and society, but also by the bond among citizens
themselves. Likewise, civic obligations such as rescue are owed both to the community at large
and to one's fellow citizens. In Glendon's words, they are responsibilities that "citizens owe to one
another." Id. at 77. Although one object of the duty to rescue is to promote the common good, it
does so by protecting the private rights and well-being of individuals. Compare text
accompanying notes 335-36 (discussing the relationship between individual rights and the
common good). For these reasons, one who wrongfully fails to rescue a fellow citizen should be
answerable not only to the community for violating its norms of conduct, but also to that
individual for the injury suffered as a result of the failure to act.
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gation to act for the benefit of both the community itself and their
fellow citizens.31
In response to this view, some might object that contemporary
society is not characterized by the sort of community that could serve
as the basis for a duty to rescue. As I have suggested, however, action
on behalf of others plays a crucial role in creating relationships
between individuals.332 Thus, the recognition of a duty to rescue might
not merely reflect but also promote a greater sense of community in
contemporary society.
This liberal-communitarian or social duty theory can be under-
stood more fully in contrast with other rationales for a duty to rescue.
Following Ames, many writers have advanced the utilitarian argu-
ment that imposing such a duty would promote the welfare of society
as a whole.3 33 Like the liberal-communitarian theory, this utilitarian
view supports a duty to rescue on the ground that it would advance
the public good. The two theories differ, however, in their conceptions
of that good. Utilitarianism identifies it with aggregate social welfare.
This conception is abstract in two respects. First, it views the public
good in abstraction from the rights of individuals. For utilitarianism,
no necessity relation exists between social welfare and individual
rights. Second, the utilitarian conception focuses on the welfare of
society as a whole, and accords no intrinsic importance to the well-
being of any particular individual (other than as it affects aggregate
welfare). For these reasons, utilitarianism is subject to the criticism
that, at least in principle, it would allow society to sacrifice even the
most important interests of an individual to promote overall social
welfare.334 In contrast, the liberal-communitarian conception of the
public good is a concrete one. On this view, the public good is not
331. A duty to rescue or assist others draws support from both contemporary liberal and
communitarian thought. For some liberal arguments in favor of such a duty, see Feinberg, 1
Moral Limits ch. 4 (cited in note 26); Rawls, A Theory of Justice §§ 19, 51 (cited in note 159)
(presenting an account of a natural duty of mutual aid). For a communitarian view, see Glendon,
Rights Talk at 78-89 (cited in note 19).
332. See notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
333. See, for example, Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 110 (cited in note 1); Weinrib, Affirmative
Case, 90 Yale L. J. at 280-87 (cited in note 13) (formulating and criticizing a utilitarian argument
for a duty to rescue). This argument may be traced back to Bentham, who suggested that "in
cases where the person is in danger, [it should be] the duty of every man to save another from
mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself." Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation 293 (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds., Athlone, 1970).
John Stuart Mill grounded his argument for a duty to rescue on his own form of utilitarianism
See note 161; Mill, On Liberty at 12 (cited in note 161) (maintaining that "the ultimate appeal on
all ethical questions" is utility, but "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent
interests of man as a progressive being").
334. See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 5 at 26 (cited in note 159).
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conceptually independent of the rights and welfare of individuals, but
incorporates them as integral elements of the good. 335 In this regard
the liberal-communitarian view follows modern natural right theory,
which views the public good as intrinsically connected with individual
rights.33
Perhaps the most common argument for a duty to rescue is
based on the view that individuals have a moral obligation to aid
others. This argument raises the fundamental question of the
relationship between law and morality. Advocates of a duty to rescue
frequently contend that the law should reflect moral norms.337
335. This contrast between utilitarianism and a concrete conception of the good is drawn
from Hegel's discussion of right and welfare. Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 125 (cited in
note 169) (articulating a conception of universal welfare), with id. §§ 128-30 (explaining Hegel's
view of the good as the unity of welfare and right).
336. Locke clearly indicates that the public good includes the protection of the life, liberty,
and property of individuals. See, for example, Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 131 (cited in note 68)
(arguing that "the power of the Society . .. can never be suppos'd to extend farther than the
common good; but is obliged to secure every ones [Liberty and] Property") (emphasis in original);
id. § 135 (asserting that the legislative power "is limited to the publick good of the Society. It is a
Power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy,
enslave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects.") (emphasis in original). Similarly, Blackstone
writes that 'the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual's private rights .... " Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *139 (cited in note 48). See
also note 335 and accompanying text (noting that Hegel's conception of the good includes the
rights of individuals).
337. See, for example, Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 1) (describing the task of
legal reform as that of "bringing our system of law more and more into harmony with moral
principles'); Weinrib, Affirmative Case, 90 Yale L. J. at 263-64 (cited in note 13) (arguing that "the
role of the common-law judge centrally involves making moral duties into legal ones").
In his 1980 article, Weinrib argued for a duty to rescue on the basis of a Kantian or deon-
tological account of the moral duty of beneficence. See Weinrib, Affirmative Case, 90 Yale L. J. at
287-92 (cited in note 13). This duty, he observed, would extend not only to rescue in emergency
situations, but also to the alleviation of poverty, starvation, and other threats to physical security.
Such a duty, however, would be indeterminate both with respect to the extent of the actions
required and with regard to 'the linking of particular benefactors to particular beneficiaries." Id.
at 291. Weinrib sought to resolve these difficulties by arguing that 'what is required is to set up
social institutions to perform the necessary tasks of coordination and determination." Id. These
institutions, which are legislative and administrative in nature, ensure that both the burdens and
the benefits of benevolence are distributed fairly. Id. at 291-92. (For a similar account, see
Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28
Stan. L. Rev. 877 (1976).) In an emergency situation, however, the 'peril cannot await assistance
from the appropriate social institutions," and the moral duty to rescue properly focuses on the
individual who is in a position to rescue. Weinrib, Affirmative Case, 90 Yale L. J. at 292.
My own approach to the problem of rescue-and especially to the relationship between the
individual duty to rescue and the role of social institutions-is deeply indebted to Weinrib's 1980
article. At the same time, some fundamental differences exist between the two approaches. For
Weinrib, the duty to rescue was based on an individual duty of benevolence, which was to be
coordinated by state institutions; for the liberal-communitarian view, by contrast, the paramount
duty is that of the community, a duty that is delegated to individuals in an emergency. It is this
emphasis on the responsibility of the community that leads to a focus on the core problem of
criminal violence and on the roots of a duty to rescue in the traditional common-law duty to
prevent violence. Moreover, the liberal-communitarian theory views the duty to rescue as
essentially one of right or justice, rather than as a moral duty, as Weinrib viewed it in his 1980
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Opponents often acknowledge the existence of a moral obligation to
rescue, but deny that law can properly enforce morality.338
The liberal-communitarian theory occupies a middle ground
between these two positions, rejecting both the view that the role of
law is to enforce morality and the view that law and morality are
entirely distinct. Instead, it holds that moral duties are enforceable
only to the extent that they can be transformed into duties of right or
community. In this respect, the theory follows the natural right views
that we have considered. For Pufendorf (and, I have suggested, for
Locke), the obligation to aid others is generally a moral one, but it
becomes a duty of justice when this assistance is necessary to preserve
the life of another23 9 For Hegel, morality is inward and beyond legal
compulsion; however, morality attains its concrete existence in the
world in the form of social relationships, which involve positive du-
ties.340 As these authors recognize, although right and morality (and,
for Hegel, community) are largely distinct spheres, they are not en-
tirely static and separate from one another. In some circumstances,
duties of morality overlap with or are transformed into those of right
or community, and thereby become legally enforceable. The liberal-
communitarian theory understands the duty to rescue in these terms.
This duty is based not on morality as such, but on the rights of the
endangered person and on the rescuer's obligation as a member of the
community.3 41
article. Understanding the duty to rescue in moral terms exposes it to the objection that morality
cannot properly be enforced through law. It was this consideration that led Weinrib, in his later
work, to repudiate the duty to rescue in private law. See note 13.
338. See, for example, Epstein, 2 J. Legal Stud. at 200-01 (cited in note 11); Weinrib, 87
Colum. L. Rev. at 501-03 (cited in note 13). The best-known statement of this position appears in
Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1897):
Actionable negligence is the neglect of a legal duty.... With purely moral obligations the
law does not deal. For example, the priest and the Levite who passed by on the other side
were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man who fell
among thieves, which they might, and morally ought to have, prevented or relieved.
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track, and a car
approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the
child's injury, or indictable under the statute for its death.
Id. at 810. See also Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 App. Cas. 1004, 1027 (judgment of Lord
Reid) (stating that "when a person has done nothing to put himself in any relationship with
another person in distress or with his property mere physical propinquity does not require him to
go to that person's assistance. There may be a moral duty to do so, but it is not practicable to
make it a legal duty.").
339. See text accompanying notes 113-28.
340. See text accompanying notes 239-52.
341. This view of the relation between law and morality can be further illustrated by
considering some related issues. The problem is debated most often in connection with the legal
regulation of sexuality. In general, it can be argued that private, consensual sexual conduct does
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One of the most original contributions to the debate on rescue
in recent years appears in Leslie Bender's article on feminist theory
and tort law. 342  Drawing on Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice 343
Bender contrasts two different approaches to moral issues: a tradi-
tional or masculine perspective emphasizing "abstract, objective, rule-
based decisions supported by notions of individual autonomy, individ-
ual rights, the separation of self from others, equality, and fairness";
and a "different voice," more characteristic of women's moral develop-
ment, that "focus[es] on the particular context of problems, relation-
ships, caring (compassion and need), equity, and responsibility."344
Our legal system, Bender contends, has been dominated by the former
perspective.345  The traditional approach to tort law tends to "view
accidents and tragedies abstractly, removed from their social and
particularized contexts, and to apply instead rationally-derived uni-
versal principles and a vision of human nature as atomistic, self-inter-
ested, and as free from constraint as possible."3 46 This approach is
exemplified by the no-duty rule, which sacrifices care for others to
"liberalism's concerns for autonomy and liberty." 47
In place of the no-duty doctrine, Bender argues for a legal duty
to rescue inspired by "a feminist ethic based upon notions of caring,
responsibility, interconnectedness, and cooperation":348
In defining duty, what matters is that someone, a human being, a part of us,
is drowning and will die without some affirmative action. That seems more
urgent, more imperative, more important than any possible infringement of
not violate the rights of any other person and violates no duty inherent in an individual's
relationship with the community and its members. Thus, this conduct in principle is beyond the
legitimate realm of legal regulation. See, for example, H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
(Stanford U., 1963). The same is true of abortion, unless the fetus is considered a person (and
thus endowed with rights), or sufficiently close to that status to justify the state's assertion of an
interest in its preservation. (To the extent that such a right or interest exists, this does not
necessarily mean that abortion can be outlawed, but rather that the issue is one that is properly
subject to legal determination, to be resolved by weighing the conflicting rights and interests
involved.) In contrast to these cases, the duty to rescue can be enforced through law because that
duty is based on the rights and obligations of membership in the community.
Of course, much more discussion would be required to provide an adequate account of the re-
lationship between law, morality, and community. In particular, it would be necessary to give a
fuller account of when an obligation legitimately can constitute a duty of right or community.
What has been said thus far, however, should be sufficient to indicate the basic approach I wish to
take.
342. Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 3 (cited in note 5).
343. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(Harvard U., 1982).
344. Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 28 (cited in note 5).
345. See id. at 32.
346. Id. at 33.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 34.
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individual autonomy by the imposition of an affirmative duty. If we think
about the stranger as a human being for a moment, we may realize that much
more is involved than balancing one person's interest in having his life saved
and another's interest in not having affirmative duties imposed upon him in
the absence of a special relationship, although even then the balance seems to
me to weigh in favor of imposing a duty or standard of care that requires ac-
tion. The drowning stranger is not the only person affected by the lack of
care. He is not detached from everyone else. He no doubt has people who
care about him-parents, spouse, children, friends, colleagues; groups he par-
ticipates in-religious, social, athletic, artistic, political, educational, work-re-
lated; he may even have people who depend upon him for emotional or finan-
cial support. He is interconnected with others. If the stranger drowns, many
will be harmed. It is not an isolated event with one person's interests bal-
anced against another's....
... Why should our autonomy or freedom not to rescue weigh more heav-
ily in law than a stranger's harms and the consequent harms to people with
whom she is interconnected? 349
By connecting the problem of rescue to the feminist critique of
law, and by emphasizing relationship as the basis of a duty to rescue,
Bender makes an important contribution to the debate. As
articulated in this passage, however, her conception of relationship or
"interconnectedness" suffers from a crucial ambiguity. In the latter
part of the passage, Bender focuses on the concrete social relation-
ships that exist between the victim and those closely connected with
him-his family, friends, and so on. This contextual notion of
interconnectedness may well justify the imposition of affirmative
duties on family members, friends, and so forth, based on their special
relationship with the victim.3s ° It does little, however, to justify the
imposition of a duty to rescue on a stranger, someone who does not
have a special relationship with the victim.3 51 To establish such a
duty, Bender falls back on a rather different notion of interconnected-
ness, one that asserts that all human beings are interconnected with
each other, and that this connection provides the basis of a general
obligation to rescue.3 52  This conception of interconnectedness,
349. Id. at 34-35.
350. See part V.B.2.a (discussing duties arising from special relationships).
351. Although Bender does not articulate the argument this way, she might respond that
society constitutes a web of relationships, and that a stranger is connected to the victim indirectly
through this web. On this view, a potential rescuer R would recognize that the death of the
victim V would cause (physical, economic, or emotional) harm to Vs friend or family member U,
which in turn would cause harm to T, and so on, ultimately resulting in harm to R herself. It
seems, however, that these ripples would dissipate rather quickly. Thus, this account provides a
much less forceful rationale for a general duty to rescue than if one could establish a direct
relationship between rescuer and victim.
352. Bender, 38 J. Legal Educ. at 34 (cited in note 5) (observing that '[i]n defining duty, what
matters is that someone, a human being, a part of us, is drowning and will die without some
affirmative action").
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however, is an abstract one. Indeed, it would seem to be precisely the
sort of abstract, acontextual, universal conception that Bender
rejects.3M
Bender thus confronts a dilemma. If interconnectedness is
conceived of in terms of concrete social relationships, it can provide the
basis for affirmative duties within special relationships, but not be-
tween strangers. If she wishes to establish a gen6ral duty to rescue,
on the other hand, she must rely on an abstract conception of
interconnectedness that is not rooted in any concrete relationship or
community. The root difficulty is that Bender (like almost everyone
who has written about the duty to rescue) accepts Ames's formulation
of the problem: whether a duty to rescue should exist between
"strangers. 354 As I have argued, however, individuals who belong to
the same society are not mere strangers but fellow citizens, a relation-
ship that provides a basis for a general duty to rescue. Thus, in con-
trast to Bender's abstract conception, the liberal-communitarian view
is based on a concrete conception of community.
Bender's view also suffers from abstraction in its portrayal of a
sharp opposition between the feminist ethic of care and the liberal
tradition. This opposition rests on a distorted view of liberalism. As
we have seen, support for a duty to rescue can be found in a range of
classical liberal thinkers including Hobbes, Locke, and Mill.355 This
distortion has unfortunate consequences, leading us to overlook the
potential grounds for a duty to rescue that exist within the liberal
political and legal tradition itself. At the same time, Bender's view
suggests that the adoption of a general duty to rescue would involve so
radical a change in existing institutions that it would be difficult or
impossible to accomplish.
The liberal-communitarian theory thus overlaps with, and
incorporates elements of, each of the other leading arguments for a
duty to rescue. Like the utilitarian position, it considers a duty to
rescue necessary for the public good. Like the moral argument, it
recognizes a moral duty to aid others. And like the feminist view, it
emphasizes relationship as the basis of affirmative obligations.
Unlike these positions, however, the liberal-communitarian theory
views the public good, morality, and relationship (insofar as they have
implications for the creation of a legal duty to rescue) in terms of a
353. See text accompanying notes 343-47.
354. Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 1).
355. See Part HI. For an argument that this feminist view also presents a distorted picture
of contemporary liberalism, see generally Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited:
Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1171 (1992).
1994]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
concrete conception of community, a community that protects the
rights and promotes the welfare of its members, who in turn have
obligations toward both the community and their fellow citizens.
B. The Contours of a Duty to Rescue
In this subpart, I briefly explore the implications of the liberal-
communitarian theory for the scope of the duty to rescue and for the
broader legal framework within which it would exist. My purpose is
not to develop a detailed blueprint for such a duty, but rather to
consider its main features. I shall begin with the general duty that
would apply to all citizens, and then consider the place of special
relationships within the theory.
1. The General Duty
In defining the scope of a duty to rescue, several questions
must be explored. First, what kinds of threatened harm to others give
rise to a duty to rescue? Second, how much effort or risk must one un-
dergo to rescue another? Third, when is rescue the responsibility of an
individual, as opposed to that of the community and its officers? Once
more, natural right theory may cast some light on these questions.
Let us start with the kinds of harm that give rise to a duty to
rescue. According to Locke, individuals enter into society for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and properties against
violence. 35 As Locke further suggests, and Kant expressly argues, the
community also has a responsibility to preserve the lives of its mem-
bers in necessity. 57 When the community itself is unable to act, this
responsibility devolves on the individual. Accordingly, the individual's
duty should extend to cases of criminal violence against person or
property, and to other dangers that pose a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily harm to others.35
With regard to the second issue, advocates of a duty to rescue,
following Ames, have generally proposed that the duty be limited to
cases in which the rescuer can act "with little or no inconvenience to
himself."359 However, because the duty to rescue is established to
356. See text accompanying note 87.
357. See text accompanying notes 143-45.
358. The inclusion of serious bodily harm in this formulation is consistent with the common-
law position that treats force calculated to cause serious bodily harm as the equivalent of deadly
force for purposes of self-defense and other privileges in tort and criminal law. See, for example,
Restatement §§ 63-66 (cited in note 5).
359. Ames, 22 Harv. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 1).
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protect the most fundamental rights and interests of individuals, it
should not be limited to situations of "easy rescue," but should require
one to do anything reasonably necessary to prevent criminal violence
or to preserve others from death or serious bodily harm.
This broad duty, however, is subject to a crucial limitation. As
discussed previously, Locke holds that an individual is bound to pre-
serve the rest of mankind only "when his own Preservation comes not
in competition."360 Locke mentions the state's power to require
individuals to risk their lives only in connection with "the
Preservation ... of the whole Commonwealth" in war.361 Similarly,
from a Hegelian perspective, although one can be required to risk
one's life in defense of the community as a whole, no justification
exists for requiring one particular individual to sacrifice his own
existence to preserve that of another.36 2  Accordingly, the duty to
rescue would not require an individual to subject himself (or other
innocent persons) to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm
in order to rescue another.363 This position is consistent with the
common-law doctrine, which required an individual to prevent a fel-
ony only when he could do so "without hazard of himself." 64
Finally, on the liberal-communitarian view, the primary re-
sponsibility for safeguarding person and property belongs to the
community as a whole, and should be carried out with its own officers
and resources. This duty devolves on the individual citizen only in an
emergency when no officer is present. Furthermore, the citizen's duty
to act in such cases would often be satisfied by calling for emergency
assistance from the police, fire department, or rescue services. An
individual would be required to intervene directly in an emergency
situation only when there was no time to obtain governmental assis-
tance.
In short, the duty to rescue that I have outlined here would
require a citizen in an emergency situation to take action reasonably
necessary to prevent either a crime of violence or a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily harm to another, unless that action would
360. Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, § 6 (cited in note 68). See text accompanying note 77.
361. See Locke, Two Treatises § 139. Likewise, Hobbes holds that individuals generally have
no duty to risk their lives, even if the sovereign commands them to do so. The one clear exception
Hobbes recognizes is the situation in which it is necessary that all bear arms in defense of the
commonwealth. See Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 21 at 151-52 (cited in note 93).
362. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 324 (cited in note 169).
363. In his 1980 article, Weinrib reached a similar result, arguing on deontological grounds
that a duty to rescue may require a rescuer to undergo substantial inconvenience, short of
physical danger or fundamental interference with his own life purposes. See Weinrib, Affirmative
Case, 90 Yale L. J. at 290 (cited in note 13).
364. Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown at *484 (cited in note 18). See text accompanying note 46.
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involve a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to the res-
cuer or to others.36 5
When an individual discharges this duty to rescue, she acts on
behalf of the community as a whole. For this reason, any resources
that she reasonably expends on the rescue (beyond a de minimis
threshold) should be recoverable from the community, through a
mechanism established for that purpose. Similarly, if the rescuer
suffers more than minimal injury to her own person or property in the
course of the rescue, she should receive compensation from the
community. Any other rule would compel some individuals to bear
costs that should be borne by the community at large, simply because
they happened to be at a place where rescue was required.3 6  This
principle of compensation should obviate the libertarian objection that
a duty to rescue would require an individual "to act at his own cost for
the exclusive benefit of another."3 67 It should also respond, at least in
part, to the problem raised by William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner-that a duty to rescue would discourage people from going to
places where rescue might be required.3 68
For several reasons, fully establishing a duty to rescue of the
sort outlined here would require legislation.369 First, this duty is owed
both to individuals and to the state and thus, in principle, is enforce-
365. This discussion of the scope of the duty to rescue has followed Locke and Kant in assum-
ing that the state's obligations to its citizens are limited to protection against violence and
preservation of life in necessity. See text accompanying notes 356-58. Accordingly, the individ-
ual's duty to act on behalf of the community is limited in the same manner. As discussed
previously, Hegel conceives of the state's function more broadly, as including the duty to prevent
contingencies that threaten the welfare of individuals. See text accompanying notes 282-84. This
view would lead to a somewhat broader duty to rescue, one that might include a duty to assist in
preventing damage to property caused by other than criminal acts.
Within a Hegelian framework, however, each individual is entitled to his own particular
welfare, and there is no reason why the welfare of the potential rescuer should be sacrificed to
preserve the mere welfare (as opposed to the life) of the victim. Compare text accompanying
notes 215-16. Compare also Humboldt, The Limits of State Action at 92 (cited in note 161)
(arguing against the imposition of affirmative duties on others because the benefits derived by
different individuals from their various pursuits are incommensurable).
For this reason, to the extent that a duty to rescue applies to the preservation of the mere
property of others, it should not require any substantial effort on the part of the rescuer, but
should be limited to a duty of "easy rescue." For example, although the law might require
individuals to report a fire on the property of another, they would not be bound to devote any
substantial time, effort, or resources to assist in putting it out, unless it posed a substantial threat
to human life.
366. For similar reasons, the public should also provide compensation to third parties when
their resources are appropriated or their persons or property injured in the course of the rescue.
367. Epstein, 2 J. Legal Stud. at 198 (cited in note 11).
368. See Landes and Posner, 7 J. Legal Stud. at 120-24 (cited in note 24). See also D'Amato,
70 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 803 (cited in note 330) (raising a similar problem).
369. As I suggest below, however, courts can establish a limited form of the duty to rescue
without legislation. See text accompanying notes 372-75.
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able by both civil and criminal liability. In the modern American legal
order, however, courts have no power to create new crimes; this power
lies exclusively with the legislature.30 Thus, if a state desires to
establish a duty to rescue with criminal sanctions, that duty must be
created by legislation.
A second reason relates to the content of the duty to rescue.
Stated in general terms, it is not a simple duty to prevent harm to
others, but rather a duty to act on behalf of and at the direction of the
community to prevent harm to others. In Locke's words, it is an
obligation "to assist the Executive Power of the Society, as the Law
thereof shall require."-"' A law of this sort would have to determine
many specific issues of policy: in what cases citizens should be
required, permitted, or forbidden to act; in what cases individuals
should act on their own, as opposed to calling the authorities; what
degree of risk rescuers should be required to run to prevent what
particular kinds of harms; to what extent an individual who inflicts
injury in the course of rescue should be privileged against liability for
that injury; and so on. Positive legislation is required to resolve these
issues.
Third, an individual who expends substantial resources or
suffers significant injury in performing the duty to rescue would re-
ceive public compensation for the loss.72 Because this compensation
would involve the expenditure of public funds, legislation is required.
Finally, the establishment of the duty to rescue would constitute a
major change in current law. Accomplishing such change is often
thought to be the province of legislatures rather than courts.
Thus, positive legislation would be required to establish a fully
developed duty to rescue. One should not infer from this proposition,
however, that the duty to rescue is merely a matter of legislative
discretion. Instead, as I have explained, this duty is based on
principles of right. As a matter of public right, an individual has a
claim to protection by the state, as well as an obligation to assist in
providing this protection for the benefit of others. A person who
suffers injury due to a breach of this obligation is entitled as a matter
of private right to recover compensation from the individual
responsible. These rights and obligations are inherent in the
relationship between the individual and the community and in the
principles of corrective justice. Legislation is necessary not because
370. See, for example, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985).
371. Locke, Two Treatisesbk. 2 § 130 (cited in note 68).
372. See notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
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the duty to rescue is a mere matter of positive law, but rather for the
reasons discussed above.
It follows that, in cases in which those reasons do not hold,
courts may be justified in recognizing an obligation to rescue even in
the absence of positive legislation. For example, courts might
recognize a limited duty to rescue that would be enforceable only in
tort law, and that would apply only to cases of "easy rescue," in which
one individual is able to rescue another with little or no risk or
expense to herself or others. This duty would merely constitute a
narrower version of the obligation that I have developed here, and
would be based on the same rationale: the responsibility of
individuals to act on behalf of the community to protect their fellow
citizens from serious harm. This limited duty, however, would involve
few of the difficulties that prevented the comprehensive duty from
being established without legislation. First, because the duty to
rescue is owed directly to other individuals as well as to the state,
courts can recognize that duty as a matter of tort law regardless of
whether the legislature has criminalized a failure to rescue. Second,
cases of easy rescue pose few of the difficult issues of policy mentioned
above.37 3 Third, easy rescues involve no significant risk of injury or
expenditure of resources that would require public compensation to
the rescuer or others. Finally, although recognition of the limited
duty would represent a major change in existing law, it would do so to
a substantially lesser extent than adoption of the comprehensive
duty.3 7 4
Of course, this limited duty would fall considerably short of the
broader position that I have developed in this subpart of the Article.
However, by articulating the rationale for a legal duty to rescue, and
by enforcing this duty in the most extreme cases (those that fall
within the scope of easy rescue), courts might spark a broader public
and legislative debate over the issue. In this way, judges might
contribute to the ultimate adoption of a comprehensive duty to rescue
without exceeding their proper role.3 75
373. See text accompanying note 371.
374. Indeed, some writers have suggested that recognition of a duty of easy rescue would
constitute a natural extension of the trend toward broader liability for inaction in the context of
voluntary undertakings and special relationships. See, for example, Weinrib, Affirmative Case, 90
Yale L. J. at 248, 268-79 (cited in note 13); note 6 and accompanying text (describing this trend).
375. Justice Ginsburg has articulated a similar approach to constitutional review. See, for
example, Excerpts from Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. Times A12 (July 21,
1993) (opening statement of Ruth Bader Ginsburg before the Senate Judiciary Committee); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198-1209 (1992)
(maintaining that 'judges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape
legal doctrine but.., participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the
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2. Special Relationships
a. The Nature and Role of Special Relationships
Finally, let us turn to special relationships. It might seem that
a theory that recognized a general duty to rescue would have no need
to impose additional duties based on such relationships. This conclu-
sion, however, overlooks the limited scope of the general duty to
rescue. As discussed previously, this duty is limited to the sort of
assistance that every member of the community should afford every
other member-protection from imminent criminal attack or from a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily harmY.3 6 When a special
relationship exists, on the other hand, it may give rise to a broader
duty.3 7 7 For example, parents are obligated to protect their children
against harm in general, not merely its most serious forms. Moreover,
this duty is not restricted to emergency situations, but is ongoing.
Special relationships would constitute an integral part of a
fully developed liberal-communitarian theory of positive duties. Such
duties, I have argued, derive from community among individuals,
while negative duties reflect the ways in which individuals are
separate from and independent of one another. Community is not
limited to the political realm, however. Indeed, at least in our own
society, community exists to a much greater extent in the form of
particular relationships and institutions. Again, the natural right
tradition provides some insight into the nature of these relationships
and institutions.
The paradigmatic special relationship is the family. For Locke,
the family is a community whose ends include affection, mutual sup-
port, procreation, and the raising of children.3 78 Accordingly, a hus-
band and wife have a duty to support and assist one another,3 79 as
well as a natural obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate their
offspring. 8° Similarly, Hegel views the family as a natural ethical
people as well."). For a classic statement of this approach, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
376. See text accompanying note 358.
377. For the same reason, the theory developed here would continue to recognize afirmative
duties arising from the actor's own conduct or voluntary undertakings. See note 6.
378. See Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, §§ 78,83 (cited in note 68).
379. See id.
380. Id. § 56. See also id. §§ 58, 60, 63, 66, 67, 78, 80. This obligation appears to be another
instance of the general duty to preserve mankind. Compare id. § 6 (quoted in the text
accompanying note 77) (articulating the natural duty to preserve mankind) with id. §§ 56, 60
(using similar language to describe the natural duty to preserve one's offspring).
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community based on love.31' The family is primarily responsible for
the support of its members, who have a right to receive support.382
Both of these views would recognize a duty of family members to pro-
tect one another from harm.
The Lockean and Hegelian views differ, however, as to the
nature of other social relationships. For Locke, relationships other
than that between parent and child are voluntary ones, formed for the
mutual benefit of their members with regard to some particular end.
These relationships are based on mutual agreement or consent, and
the rights and obligations they involve are essentially contractual8 m
In addition to relationships of this sort, Hegel recognizes another
category that he calls associations.3 84 As Hegel uses the term, associa-
tions are organized communities of individuals who share a common
interest or profession.315 Contemporary examples might include uni-
versities, business corporations, churches, local communities, and
other institutions or places where individuals work or spend a sub-
stantial portion of their lives. Like the family and the state, Hegel
regards these associations as ethical communities (although limited
ones) that have a considerable degree of responsibility for the well-
being of their members.-3
Hegel's account provides a stronger basis for duties arising
from special relationships than does Locke's. Consider a situation in
which a college student suffers a sudden heart attack at school and
requires immediate medical assistance. In Lockean terms, one could
argue that the implied contract between the student and the college
required the latter to provide assistance in cases of emergency. This
argument would fail, however, if the contract could not reasonably be
interpreted in this way (for example, if the college required all stu-
dents to sign a waiver of liability for any failure to provide such assis-
tance). Moreover, it would be difficult to argue that other students
had an obligation to call for help on the ground that there was an
implied agreement between students to this effect. Under the
381. See text accompanying notes 249,259.
382. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 159, 171, 174,238 (cited in note 169).
383. See, for example, Locke, Two Treatises bk. 2, §§ 78, 81-83 (cited in note 68) (treating
marriage as contractual).
384. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 250-56 (cited in note 169).
385. See id. § 251. Hegel also refers to associations as "corporations.' As Allen Wood notes,
for Hegel the term corporation 'includes not only a society of people sharing the same trade or
profession, but any society which is officially recognized by the state but is not itself a part of the
political state." Id. at 454 (ed. n.1 to § 250). Thus, the term "embraces employers as well as
employees, and... also covers religious bodies, learned societies and town councils." Inwood, A
Hegel Dictionary at 55 (cited in note 177).
386. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 252,255 (cited in note 169).
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Hegelian view, by contrast, one could argue that the college had an
obligation based merely on its relationship with the student, and that,
as members of the college community, other students also had an
affirmative duty to provide aid or seek help.
To summarize, under the liberal-communitarian theory, af-
firmative duties arise not only from membership in the general com-
munity, but also from special relationships. These include family
relationships, contractual (and other consensual) relationships, and
limited communities such as universities and places of employment.
In recent decades, American courts have recognized a wide variety of
special relationships, including those between landowner and invitee,
business and customer, employer and employee, school district and
pupil, university and student, hospital and patient, and even one
social companion and another, in addition to the traditional categories
of innkeeper-guest and carrier-passenger. 387
b. The Relation Between Special Duties and the General Duty
to Rescue
What is the relation between the duties that arise from special
relationships, on one hand, and the citizen's duty toward the state and
its members on the other? This issue can best be approached in
connection with the well-known case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp.38 In Kline, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the landlord of a
large apartment building had a special relationship with its tenants
and a consequent duty to protect them from criminal acts by third
parties. After stressing that only the landlord, not the tenants, had
the ability to provide security in the common areas of the building, the
court added that "even as between [the] landlord and the police power
of [the] government, the landlord is in the best position to take the
necessary protective measures."35 9 Municipal police lack both the
authority and the capacity to patrol the common areas of a private
apartment complex. "[In the fight against crime," the court declared,
387. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(listing special relationships); Farwell v. Keeton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1976)
(recognizing a special relationship between social companions); Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College Dist., 36 Cal.3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 1201 (1984) (recognizing a special
relationship between college and student); Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 596 S.2d 1324 (La. App.
1992) (same). Kine adds the relationship between landlord and tenant to this list. See text
accompanying notes 388-91.
388. IMine, 439 F.2d at 483-84.
389. Id. at 484.
19941 753
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"the police are not expected to do it all; every segment of society has
obligations to aid in law enforcement and to minimize the
opportunities for crime."9 0 Thus, "[i]t is only just that the obligations
of landlords in their sphere be acknowledged and enforced."39" '
As this case illustrates, a special affirmative duty, such as that
of the landlord in Kline, may be based in part on the obligor's special
relationship with other individuals, and in part on its duty to assist
the state in protecting citizens from crime and other harm. What is
the relationship between these two sources of special duties? From a
Lockean perspective, different institutions, such as a residential
community and the state, are established for different ends and give
rise to different obligations .392 Nonetheless, different duties may
reinforce one another and lead to the same result in a particular case.
Thus, in Kline, the strongest basis for imposing an affirmative duty
would rely both on the landlord's relationship to its tenants and on its
obligation to the state.
Once more, however, Hege's thought arguably provides a more
coherent account of the basis of special duties. Under the Hegelian
view, institutions such as the family or a residential community are
not entirely separate from the state, but stand in relationship with it.
These institutions mediate between the state and individuals.3 3 It is
partly through these institutions that the ends of the state, such as
the preservation of its citizens, are realized. 94 By performing its duty
toward its tenants, the landlord also assists in preventing crime; by
fulfilling its duty to the state, the landlord also provides security to its
tenants.395 The Hegelian view thus integrates the two facets of special
obligations: the duty based on the special relationship between the
parties and the duty owed to the state. From this perspective, these
obligations are not two separate duties, but two aspects of a single
duty.
To express the point another way, Lockean thought recognizes
a sharp distinction between public and private. An individual's rela-
tion to the state and her relation to private individuals thus give rise
390. Id. (footnote omitted).
391. Id.
392. In his writings, Locke frequently stresses that different institutions are formed for dif-
ferent ends and are separate and distinct from one another. See, for example, Locke, Two
Treatises bk. 2, §§ 2, 77 (cited in note 68); Locke, Toleration at 26-28 (cited in note 92) (drawing a
sharp distinction between civil and religious societies).
393. See, for example, Hegel, Philosophyof Right §§ 255,262-66 (cited in note 169).
394. See, for example, id. § 252.
395. Compare Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic § 198 (cited in note 218) (representing the
relationship between individual, state, and particular needs in a similar way).
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to entirely different duties. Hegelian thought, on the other hand,
recognizes a range of institutions that mediate between public and
private, between individuals and the state. These institutions, and
the duties that inhere in them, have both a public and a private side.
Under this view, the positive duties of parent to child, landlord to
tenant, and employer to employee are neither wholly public nor sim-
ply private, but both.
In conclusion, under the theory developed in this Article,
individuals not only have a general duty as citizens to assist the state
in preserving the lives of their fellow citizens in an emergency, but
may also have special duties based on their particular circumstances.
These special duties derive partly from special relationships and
partly from one's being in a special position to advance the ends of the
state by protecting against harm. These special duties are not neces-
sarily limited to emergency situations, but may require the actor to
guard against harm in advance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modern debate over rescue has focused on Ames's formula-
tion of the problem: whether a legal duty to rescue should exist in the
absence of any concrete relationship between the parties.3 98 When the
issue is framed in this way, however, it is difficult to establish such a
duty, because the strongest basis for affirmative obligations is to be
found precisely in the relation between the parties.
This Article has argued that Ames's formulation obscures the
most powerful argument in favor of a duty to rescue. The crucial
point, I have suggested, is to recognize that rescuer and victim are not
mere strangers, but members of a broader community. This insight
derives from the common-law and natural right traditions, the same
traditions that are often invoked to oppose a duty to rescue. Drawing
on these sources, this Article has developed a theory of rescue that
holds that the community has a responsibility to protect its citizens
from both criminal violence and other forms of harm. In return, an
individual has an obligation to assist in performing this function, an
obligation that is owed not only to the community but also to its
members, and that is enforceable in both criminal and tort law. In
this way, we can justify a duty to rescue that is consonant with both
the liberal tradition and the values of community.
396. See text accompanying note 20.
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